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Post by xxxxxxxxx on May 24, 2023 20:16:29 GMT
The more we try to grasp at truth the more we create patterns for it, that end in absurdity and contradiction, given the fact that in grasping for truth we create definitions for it, which stand apart from other definitions and truths, through which we can hold said truth from our own angle of perception; any angle of perception is a vice-grip which holds and crushes the truth until its leaks away leaving one with a state of tension as the angle of perception is fundamentally relative and subject to contradiction given its manifestations of distinctions which stand apart. Relativity is a vice-grip. Definition thus becomes a prison of the self as the self encapsulates itself within its own specific viewpoints and patterns by multiplying that which is true until it becomes relative, i.e. the definition and the act of defining, as the subjective angle of observation which is the self is a sieve which separates "this from that" when in reality there is only "what is".
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Post by Eugene 2.0 on Aug 10, 2023 17:25:23 GMT
I like both arguments that 'truth is not a thing', and that 'things exist before no-thing'. Both are very plausible. I think there's an agreement for them: If truth isn't a thing, then truths appears right after things. Actually it sounds very true, just check this out: If for a certain thing to be itself something else is needed, then for all the things 'no-things" is needed, and exactly this requirement is what causes the truth to appear. The truth doesn't exist before things, it appears either after, or along with the things. 1. If truth is not a thing, and things exist before no-thing, then truth comes after existence. 2. If truth comes after existence then existence is not a truth (as it is before truth). 3. Existence coming before truth necessitates truth as an illusion (as existence is before truth thus existence precedes truth; the totality of existence is beyond truth and with it truth is just a fragment thus partial and relative).
If there were chaos, then it would be possible for this world to appear. As well as the natural number sequence to appears among π sequence. (I mean 3,1415... and 123456789... and so forth are compatible.) So, it's not impossible for truth to appear after illusions.
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Post by xxxxxxxxx on Aug 18, 2023 20:02:26 GMT
1. If truth is not a thing, and things exist before no-thing, then truth comes after existence. 2. If truth comes after existence then existence is not a truth (as it is before truth). 3. Existence coming before truth necessitates truth as an illusion (as existence is before truth thus existence precedes truth; the totality of existence is beyond truth and with it truth is just a fragment thus partial and relative).
If there were chaos, then it would be possible for this world to appear. As well as the natural number sequence to appears among π sequence. (I mean 3,1415... and 123456789... and so forth are compatible.) So, it's not impossible for truth to appear after illusions. So if truth can appear after an illusion, thus that mean untruth (illusion) can be a grounds for truth?
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Post by Eugene 2.0 on Sept 21, 2023 15:38:42 GMT
If there were chaos, then it would be possible for this world to appear. As well as the natural number sequence to appears among π sequence. (I mean 3,1415... and 123456789... and so forth are compatible.) So, it's not impossible for truth to appear after illusions. So if truth can appear after an illusion, thus that mean untruth (illusion) can be a grounds for truth? You are right, indeed how could truth appear after then... This is a very delicate and really sharp notice you did. I didn't even realize anything like that. If such a truth appeared after a mess or a chaos, then how would it be going to be true? I do like this line of a thought of yours, because it transfers me to an idea that God must be at the very beginning of anything else, and no 'chaos before God' is possible. I'm not really sure, only some guesses, but this type of argument reminds me of the Kalam one. I'm not familiar with it, but I know one modern philosopher who wrote about it.
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