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Post by xxxxxxxxx on Apr 12, 2023 22:54:39 GMT
If all logic is dependent upon forms and forms are relative then all logic is relative. If logic is relative then it is true under some contexts but not in others. These prior statements are logical forms, i.e. 'if a is b and b is c then a is c' and 'if a then b', thus the statements are not universally true as they are relative. A self-contradiction occurs as the statement is true under certain contexts, false in other contexts, but both true and false in light of all contexts.
The problem occurs as the statements 'logic is dependent upon forms' and 'forms are relative' are true statements universally as they can be repeatably verified empirically (i.e. we can see forms in all logic and we can also see that forms are relative as they compare and contrast to other forms).
Under these terms correct abstractions and correct empirical observations contradict.
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Post by Eugene 2.0 on Apr 14, 2023 7:37:20 GMT
It's really helpful.
Another example of mine is that, let's imagine no empirical world, or the world where we aren't certain about empiricity, or we are careless, etc.
Let's say we know that there are forms in this world. The question is which forms are true? If a set pf true forms is T, and logical forms → L, then it must be that all L belong to T. (If logic is untrue, then for why do we need it at all?)
Anyway, how to find out which forms are true? Deliberately or just consequently? There must be an agreement or something, because to prefer some forms A to forms be there has to be some forms C, and this process never ends.
But, okay, let's say we've got somehow a way to decide which forms are logical, what's then? Where is any guarantee that a set K is identical to M? The law of identity in logic --- cannot demonstrate and sure us ---: if we have something like any X=X so what is then? What must assure me that the first X and the second X are the same? --- The law pf identity itself has a pathetical mistake: it formulates an identity between X's, while demonstrating that there are two X!
Logic is nothing, but our believing in certain forms.
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Post by xxxxxxxxx on Apr 14, 2023 17:57:03 GMT
It's really helpful. Another example of mine is that, let's imagine no empirical world, or the world where we aren't certain about empiricity, or we are careless, etc. Let's say we know that there are forms in this world. The question is which forms are true? If a set pf true forms is T, and logical forms → L, then it must be that all L belong to T. (If logic is untrue, then for why do we need it at all?) Anyway, how to find out which forms are true? Deliberately or just consequently? There must be an agreement or something, because to prefer some forms A to forms be there has to be some forms C, and this process never ends. But, okay, let's say we've got somehow a way to decide which forms are logical, what's then? Where is any guarantee that a set K is identical to M? The law of identity in logic --- cannot demonstrate and sure us ---: if we have something like any X=X so what is then? What must assure me that the first X and the second X are the same? --- The law pf identity itself has a pathetical mistake: it formulates an identity between X's, while demonstrating that there are two X! Logic is nothing, but our believing in certain forms. We only observe forms because without forms we observe no-thing. Considering all forms are relative, in the respect they must relate through connection or contrast, all forms have a truth value relative to certain contexts and a false value relative to other contexts. When looking at the totality of contexts all forms are simultaneously true and false...this is a contradiction.
But yes logic is nothing other than the acceptance of forms.
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Post by Eugene 2.0 on Apr 14, 2023 20:21:20 GMT
It's really helpful. Another example of mine is that, let's imagine no empirical world, or the world where we aren't certain about empiricity, or we are careless, etc. Let's say we know that there are forms in this world. The question is which forms are true? If a set pf true forms is T, and logical forms → L, then it must be that all L belong to T. (If logic is untrue, then for why do we need it at all?) Anyway, how to find out which forms are true? Deliberately or just consequently? There must be an agreement or something, because to prefer some forms A to forms be there has to be some forms C, and this process never ends. But, okay, let's say we've got somehow a way to decide which forms are logical, what's then? Where is any guarantee that a set K is identical to M? The law of identity in logic --- cannot demonstrate and sure us ---: if we have something like any X=X so what is then? What must assure me that the first X and the second X are the same? --- The law pf identity itself has a pathetical mistake: it formulates an identity between X's, while demonstrating that there are two X! Logic is nothing, but our believing in certain forms. We only observe forms because without forms we observe no-thing. Considering all forms are relative, in the respect they must relate through connection or contrast, all forms have a truth value relative to certain contexts and a false value relative to other contexts. When looking at the totality of contexts all forms are simultaneously true and false...this is a contradiction.
But yes logic is nothing other than the acceptance of forms.
Discussion with you by no means helps me to get through – to transcend to the next level of thoughts. Viewing anything via forms – it's an interesting idea, can't say I thought about it much. You also said very true about contrast and connection. In my view there are correspondence and differentiation. Let's say that there's no insurances if everything is devoured into forms, or that everything is consist of forms, etc. But how to escape then? Seems if we want to claim that some forms are not forms means that we have to take something - as a criteria – to find it out, but how? It's impossible to measure something not having any form, and this means that all what we can do is either to fit (to apply, or to put) a form to a form, or to differ (to put away, etc) a form from a form... Either way what is going on is correspondence or differentiation between forms. That's it. The question is – when forms are the same, and when they are not. If we decide to move further only thinking of it (a priori), then we are able to assume it, and it approves or justifies the role of logic. Else, we have to match forms, but this path has its underwater rocks. |
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