Post by Eugene 2.0 on Nov 30, 2021 12:50:58 GMT
• Hegelian and alike philosophies can be viewed in a way of their trinity, fourthly, fifthly... N-ity systems.
• Usually the main rule for those systems are: a) being structured by N-ity, and b) being generative.
• Genesis-like character of such systems might be a product of their relation with religious systems (most of those philosophers as it seems tried to make their systems be better, than religious systems), or the idea of making their creations be coherent.
• For instance, if P is X, and if not-P is Y, then P and not-P, as Hegel's system works. And such typical structures are to gather all the possible cases, and to explain everything.
• Anyway, they were wrong at some thoughts, so let's note those fallacies of theirs.
P1. When someone is trying to understand or explain a thing, he does need to mark, define, and, maybe, locate a thing. One can use different ways of doing it, while any of them require an explanation what makes that thing to be this thing, or finally to exist (to be). However, those explanations introduce something that we usually call properties or arbitraties.And those deities are just new deities which, in turn, are also needed to be explained. Moreover, how one may hope one's definition is true, since any properties or arbitraties may depend on something else, something additional, like in this example:
(i) One saw a sinking ship, therefore (one decides) ships (can) sink
(ii) Ship (can) sink only if they are broken
(iii) One saw a broken ship
(iv) To be broken for a ship is necessary to have either wrong construction, or to have some violation of its construction
Even for (iv) – to explain the wrong construction one should go further and further, so the property of the ships that person in (i-iii) saw was a sequence of (iv) or some even other ones reasons.
In any case, properties are never known without relations.
P2. One thing can have numerous properties. It follows the precious example from doubting (iv) to be the last one reason.
P3. No generativeness is achievable except for claiming its necessary nature, but how such insurance one can achieve? This type of fallacy is being mislead by the next: there is only one relation (or a type of) between certain things. On the other hand, why to claim it so rigorously if no attempts can be reached. Let's check this out by another example:
(v) One decided a ship was broken, because of the engine damage
(vi) The ship was broken by a drunken sailor
(vii) The sailor smashed the electronics control center
(viii) The sailor was almost dead when he broke the control center
(ix) Someone had killed the sailor
(x) The sailor poisoned oneself with a spoiled ale
The sequence of doubts may be continued as in (iv) of P1. The previous shows how can anyone might be misguided by different conclusions. But an important addition here is that different relations between things may occur for something to happen. What was the real reason for the ship to sink? And didn't it impossible many relations had happened simultaneously? Plus to it, even if one event can happen, nothing confirms that relation to be the one.
P4. The next example will help to see why plurality of relations happen simultaneously better;
(xi) A mafiosi Mike was killed
(xii) A Mike's enemy named Nico pull the trigger of his gun and shot Mike
(xiii) Another enemy of Mike names Karl poured a pint of poison into Mike's whiskey glass
(xiv) Before the death Mike drank the glass of whiskey and caught a bullet into his heart
(xv) Mike died, because of being shot and poisoned
Who after all killed Mike? Nico? Karl? Both? For us this dilemma isn't so important as for the juries, but for us it's quite more important to note – here is an example of two relations happen together.
P5. Finally. One may confuse my premises P1-P4, thinking I wanted to say that there is infinite number of relations, and the same of properties. Like saying: everything is in chaos, and there's no hope to say anything for certain. This wouldn't be a good inference, even taking into account that it might be one of confusions. That how things might be if the relations be infinite:
if a property P for x is being established only by some relation R with y, and if xRy → infinite, means there is no x
Instead of making such a powerful conclusion my point was that those systems I've been mentioning are too wide and too general, and their structures are suffered from uncertainty. That is why no need of taking those reasons as a basis for metaphysics or a philosophy basis.
• Usually the main rule for those systems are: a) being structured by N-ity, and b) being generative.
• Genesis-like character of such systems might be a product of their relation with religious systems (most of those philosophers as it seems tried to make their systems be better, than religious systems), or the idea of making their creations be coherent.
• For instance, if P is X, and if not-P is Y, then P and not-P, as Hegel's system works. And such typical structures are to gather all the possible cases, and to explain everything.
• Anyway, they were wrong at some thoughts, so let's note those fallacies of theirs.
P1. When someone is trying to understand or explain a thing, he does need to mark, define, and, maybe, locate a thing. One can use different ways of doing it, while any of them require an explanation what makes that thing to be this thing, or finally to exist (to be). However, those explanations introduce something that we usually call properties or arbitraties.And those deities are just new deities which, in turn, are also needed to be explained. Moreover, how one may hope one's definition is true, since any properties or arbitraties may depend on something else, something additional, like in this example:
(i) One saw a sinking ship, therefore (one decides) ships (can) sink
(ii) Ship (can) sink only if they are broken
(iii) One saw a broken ship
(iv) To be broken for a ship is necessary to have either wrong construction, or to have some violation of its construction
Even for (iv) – to explain the wrong construction one should go further and further, so the property of the ships that person in (i-iii) saw was a sequence of (iv) or some even other ones reasons.
In any case, properties are never known without relations.
P2. One thing can have numerous properties. It follows the precious example from doubting (iv) to be the last one reason.
P3. No generativeness is achievable except for claiming its necessary nature, but how such insurance one can achieve? This type of fallacy is being mislead by the next: there is only one relation (or a type of) between certain things. On the other hand, why to claim it so rigorously if no attempts can be reached. Let's check this out by another example:
(v) One decided a ship was broken, because of the engine damage
(vi) The ship was broken by a drunken sailor
(vii) The sailor smashed the electronics control center
(viii) The sailor was almost dead when he broke the control center
(ix) Someone had killed the sailor
(x) The sailor poisoned oneself with a spoiled ale
The sequence of doubts may be continued as in (iv) of P1. The previous shows how can anyone might be misguided by different conclusions. But an important addition here is that different relations between things may occur for something to happen. What was the real reason for the ship to sink? And didn't it impossible many relations had happened simultaneously? Plus to it, even if one event can happen, nothing confirms that relation to be the one.
P4. The next example will help to see why plurality of relations happen simultaneously better;
(xi) A mafiosi Mike was killed
(xii) A Mike's enemy named Nico pull the trigger of his gun and shot Mike
(xiii) Another enemy of Mike names Karl poured a pint of poison into Mike's whiskey glass
(xiv) Before the death Mike drank the glass of whiskey and caught a bullet into his heart
(xv) Mike died, because of being shot and poisoned
Who after all killed Mike? Nico? Karl? Both? For us this dilemma isn't so important as for the juries, but for us it's quite more important to note – here is an example of two relations happen together.
P5. Finally. One may confuse my premises P1-P4, thinking I wanted to say that there is infinite number of relations, and the same of properties. Like saying: everything is in chaos, and there's no hope to say anything for certain. This wouldn't be a good inference, even taking into account that it might be one of confusions. That how things might be if the relations be infinite:
if a property P for x is being established only by some relation R with y, and if xRy → infinite, means there is no x
Instead of making such a powerful conclusion my point was that those systems I've been mentioning are too wide and too general, and their structures are suffered from uncertainty. That is why no need of taking those reasons as a basis for metaphysics or a philosophy basis.