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Post by Eugene 2.0 on Mar 18, 2021 21:27:50 GMT
Indeed, does every person feel or conceive the same asking oneself another philosophical question, or we're all feeling different, asking it?
I mean let's suppose a person had asked a philosophical question and, accidentally, solved it. Would that answer be fair for every person who had asked the same question, or each answer would be different for anyone?
Or how to understand that people ask the same philosophical questions? The form of sentences can be deceived, and it's uncertain way to roughly generalize all the personal questions with philosophical questions. And, therefore, how to be certain about philosophical questions are intersubjective?
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Post by jonbain on Apr 16, 2021 18:40:09 GMT
Indeed, does every person feel or conceive the same asking oneself another philosophical question, or we're all feeling different, asking it? I mean let's suppose a person had asked a philosophical question and, accidentally, solved it. Would that answer be fair for every person who had asked the same question, or each answer would be different for anyone? Or how to understand that people ask the same philosophical questions? The form of sentences can be deceived, and it's uncertain way to roughly generalize all the personal questions with philosophical questions. And, therefore, how to be certain about philosophical questions are intersubjective? Two people can certainly use the same question and not mean the same thing. But the REAL essential philosophical questions are identical for everyone. However circumstance and language make the narrative of discovery different. 1) We have questions of logical principle: philosophy, what Kant called the "analytical a priori". 2) Questions of empirical detail: materialism perhaps, which Kant called the "synthetic a posteriori" The first is universal. The second is particular.
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