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Post by xxxxxxxxx on Sept 14, 2020 16:36:56 GMT
P=P is circular reasoning given the same assertion made in the beginning is the same as in the end. P=P is thus a contradiction.
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Post by xxxxxxxxx on Sept 15, 2020 15:19:47 GMT
The fallacy of circularity defines an argument by what it is not linear. That argument is rational all the way up to its circularity in which case the premise is repeated in the conclusion thus reflecting an absence of divergence to a new assertion. The absence of divergence to a new assertion thus results in an absence of analysis resulting in a new truth value. This fallaciousness is derived from an absence of progressive linear reasoning where one assertion is justified by its divergence to it's new assertion, justification is derived from one assertion progressing to another.
So while the premise and conclusion, or the beginning and end of the assertion are true, an absence of truth value occurs because of the absence of justification of the assertion through another assertion. One assertion is defined by its relationship to another and with this absence of relation a contradiction occurs given the assertion is absent of contrasting assertions therefore leaving it as fundamentally formless in nature. Absence of form is contradiction considering that which is without form is that which cannot be sensed and this absence of form occurs through the emptiness of circularity.
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Post by Eugene 2.0 on Sept 16, 2020 5:45:26 GMT
Must say that the logic of this is not obvious for me.
When I take p=p, I don't take it as anything else except for a specific case. So, it might be that no p=p are real. However, we have to notify that when we say smth like that: "p=p is not real" – all what we're talking about is "the reality", i.e. we address "p=p" to "reality" or we're merging the former with the latter.
I take p=p as a case, but as so to reality – I should define it somehow or to conclude about it something. It's important to note, that I couldn't do it, and, in turn, the ontology had been constructed as something I didn't care about. However, such situation doesn't seem to be appreciated. Indeed, am I gonna just get rid of the problem? No. So, to solve it somehow all what I have to do is to try to do it somehow, and to conclude something about it.
"Reality" is not necessary the only one possible ontology, therefore we can take it in a different way. Which one would be better? Probably, we need to find the relatio, or, more precisely, correlation of what do we conclude about p=p, in a particular example, and what we take as "the reality". Closer look makes us get that as p=p, so the reality are kinda variables with specific properties, or – in case we're on some Indian Logic (nyaa) – we must take the concepts as material representations.
And, my opinion, that only finding correlations we might get something useful. At the same time, I do not think any speculations about one of the concepts are useless and no purpose, what I want to say more specific is that: finding correlations would help us to think about all that together, not separately only. It's like: to share a hand of help, or to let anyone (!) to join the discussion.
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Post by xxxxxxxxx on Sept 16, 2020 16:04:29 GMT
Must say that the logic of this is not obvious for me. When I take p=p, I don't take it as anything else except for a specific case. So, it might be that no p=p are real. However, we have to notify that when we say smth like that: "p=p is not real" – all what we're talking about is "the reality", i.e. we address "p=p" to "reality" or we're merging the former with the latter. I take p=p as a case, but as so to reality – I should define it somehow or to conclude about it something. It's important to note, that I couldn't do it, and, in turn, the ontology had been constructed as something I didn't care about. However, such situation doesn't seem to be appreciated. Indeed, am I gonna just get rid of the problem? No. So, to solve it somehow all what I have to do is to try to do it somehow, and to conclude something about it. "Reality" is not necessary the only one possible ontology, therefore we can take it in a different way. Which one would be better? Probably, we need to find the relatio, or, more precisely, correlation of what do we conclude about p=p, in a particular example, and what we take as "the reality". Closer look makes us get that as p=p, so the reality are kinda variables with specific properties, or – in case we're on some Indian Logic (nyaa) – we must take the concepts as material representations. And, my opinion, that only finding correlations we might get something useful. At the same time, I do not think any speculations about one of the concepts are useless and no purpose, what I want to say more specific is that: finding correlations would help us to think about all that together, not separately only. It's like: to share a hand of help, or to let anyone (!) to join the discussion. So while the premise and conclusion, or the beginning and end of the assertion are true, an absence of truth value occurs because of the absence of justification of the assertion through another assertion. One assertion is defined by its relationship to another and with this absence of relation a contradiction occurs given the assertion is absent of contrasting assertions therefore leaving it as fundamentally formless in nature.
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