Post by Eugene 2.0 on Oct 30, 2020 20:24:36 GMT
1. Materialism as a teaching is in a big problem, so because of that physics long this consider coincidences or some events with some particles are as what can view us the tissue of the reality.
Briefly, the substance of the world can be seen through many process involving tiny particles. Big massive ones are atoms, molecules, and so one. One type of reality (e.g. atomic level or another one level) might have its own laws, or its own statistical regularities. Some levels of reality can be described using limited apparatus (Newton's mechanics), some cannot (particle-wave effect). No matter what many Earth processes can be ascribed using old and proved Newton's principles.
2. Thoughts are what we can take as a rock or a gun. It probably has the same type as a university, or a noun. It can be feel by a hand or tasted by a tongue, but it can be conceptually accepted. What do I mean saying "conceptually accepted", and in particular, what does it mean "conceptual"?
Actually, this is what cannot have absolute neutral and common definition, but it has been defined. Firstly, if to look at the notion subconsicousness and to consider there is something in us, that does influence in us, we can see that there are some processes we are being unaware of. So, we do something, but we do it either spontaneously, or non-intentionally. To look up at conceptual one we have to take an inverted subconsciousness. This would get us closer to this.
Thus, concepts occurs in us as all the processes behind us that intentionally support our image or a view. We're are the receivers of concepts, and we use them intentionally, while there are inner barriers or inner rally in us that as the obstacles form the finished concepts.
3. Another way to get it is to try to comprehend how is it possible for something to be defined? If I define something it usually means I give this something a name. But to separate a named thing I need to perform it somehow, but how? Wittgenstein was trying to problematize Augustine in his "Philosophical Investigations" (1951) saying that Augustine had been trying to allow that a person had an ability to speak before achieveing the actual ability of speaking. So, to speak on a language one must have another language before.
Anyway, how to separate one thing from another one? - To give a name. All the complementary processes that occur during this act of naming are just another, extra thoughts. We cannot even be sure whether or not those thoughts arise along with the first act of naming process. All what we can to do is to try to name something.
4. Some may view concepts as ideas. This view was well-shared long ago, perhaps even before Plato's philosophy. A group of some elements which structure can be maintain as a state of affairs receives a name and this last one is an idea itself. (Some sees this mechanism in some other way, saying that the name is just a from of the previous projection.)
I think such an idea has some flaws. From where ideas come? Some may answer: from dreams, from inspirations, etc. But it's not a real answer. If we want to answer: from where this wind is blowing? It's not serious to answer: from dream or from a someone's inspiration. No. That was a direct answer about directions. Even to asking questions we have to be alert not turning away from the point.
Another flaw is the view of idea or an idea itself. What is it? Can somebody answer it? If we make a loop saying that an idea is what inspires us during concept-making, then we will come to nothing. Idea is something unseen, and, probably, undefied. Plato in his "Parmenides" was trying to get through exactly ideas adventures. He wanted to find out whether or not ideas can be self-destructed, or can they stick with each other, and so one. Well, since "Parmenides" has no real answers (we don't even know what Plato wanted to say us by that work), we're stuck in guessing.
5. The real step-forward is to admire physical aspects of the processes of conceptualization. We don't know for sure, and we are not about to go throught it right now, but we can mathematically or logically count some things in our conceptual views. We can look at one group of concepts within another one, and so on, to get some extra info about it. I am sure about laws behind it, but - as physics - those laws could be nothing, but statistical regularities; and, in turn, looking for solid, one-phrase-defined definitions isn't necessary. We need to start comprehending mechanisms of calculating concepts. This task I find to be interesting to accept.
Briefly, the substance of the world can be seen through many process involving tiny particles. Big massive ones are atoms, molecules, and so one. One type of reality (e.g. atomic level or another one level) might have its own laws, or its own statistical regularities. Some levels of reality can be described using limited apparatus (Newton's mechanics), some cannot (particle-wave effect). No matter what many Earth processes can be ascribed using old and proved Newton's principles.
2. Thoughts are what we can take as a rock or a gun. It probably has the same type as a university, or a noun. It can be feel by a hand or tasted by a tongue, but it can be conceptually accepted. What do I mean saying "conceptually accepted", and in particular, what does it mean "conceptual"?
Actually, this is what cannot have absolute neutral and common definition, but it has been defined. Firstly, if to look at the notion subconsicousness and to consider there is something in us, that does influence in us, we can see that there are some processes we are being unaware of. So, we do something, but we do it either spontaneously, or non-intentionally. To look up at conceptual one we have to take an inverted subconsciousness. This would get us closer to this.
Thus, concepts occurs in us as all the processes behind us that intentionally support our image or a view. We're are the receivers of concepts, and we use them intentionally, while there are inner barriers or inner rally in us that as the obstacles form the finished concepts.
3. Another way to get it is to try to comprehend how is it possible for something to be defined? If I define something it usually means I give this something a name. But to separate a named thing I need to perform it somehow, but how? Wittgenstein was trying to problematize Augustine in his "Philosophical Investigations" (1951) saying that Augustine had been trying to allow that a person had an ability to speak before achieveing the actual ability of speaking. So, to speak on a language one must have another language before.
Anyway, how to separate one thing from another one? - To give a name. All the complementary processes that occur during this act of naming are just another, extra thoughts. We cannot even be sure whether or not those thoughts arise along with the first act of naming process. All what we can to do is to try to name something.
4. Some may view concepts as ideas. This view was well-shared long ago, perhaps even before Plato's philosophy. A group of some elements which structure can be maintain as a state of affairs receives a name and this last one is an idea itself. (Some sees this mechanism in some other way, saying that the name is just a from of the previous projection.)
I think such an idea has some flaws. From where ideas come? Some may answer: from dreams, from inspirations, etc. But it's not a real answer. If we want to answer: from where this wind is blowing? It's not serious to answer: from dream or from a someone's inspiration. No. That was a direct answer about directions. Even to asking questions we have to be alert not turning away from the point.
Another flaw is the view of idea or an idea itself. What is it? Can somebody answer it? If we make a loop saying that an idea is what inspires us during concept-making, then we will come to nothing. Idea is something unseen, and, probably, undefied. Plato in his "Parmenides" was trying to get through exactly ideas adventures. He wanted to find out whether or not ideas can be self-destructed, or can they stick with each other, and so one. Well, since "Parmenides" has no real answers (we don't even know what Plato wanted to say us by that work), we're stuck in guessing.
5. The real step-forward is to admire physical aspects of the processes of conceptualization. We don't know for sure, and we are not about to go throught it right now, but we can mathematically or logically count some things in our conceptual views. We can look at one group of concepts within another one, and so on, to get some extra info about it. I am sure about laws behind it, but - as physics - those laws could be nothing, but statistical regularities; and, in turn, looking for solid, one-phrase-defined definitions isn't necessary. We need to start comprehending mechanisms of calculating concepts. This task I find to be interesting to accept.
