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Post by Eugene 2.0 on May 9, 2023 18:12:00 GMT
No really important which size of A, or B we've got in our brains or in our mind (whatever). It's most important that we can say about A or B that A is bigger, or smaller, than B (or equal to each other). And it's also important that we cannot start with no A or B. Why with A or B? The thing is that without two or more elements we would never know about A or B solely. A must be defined relatively to B, and B to A. So, we start from something, and we use plain predicates to compare things in our heads. By that logic we can compare things respectively to their disposition or location, and to their timing. The first is space, and 2nd is time. If one thing is in another one, then we've got some kind of a plainest map or them - their location. If we know that A comes first, and then comes B, then we know the primitive scenario about the time. Then space and time may be expanded or widen; the same is about time - we may increase the number of events. 1. We talk about things in general: - we don't care about size or many other circumstantial or non-important features of things
- taking one thing as an example we can say about all of them which are alike it
2. We talk about one thing using others: - we aim at a characteristic (a verb, or an adjective) that allows us to place things
- it's a simple way to say about many things using such a type that allows to say about more (if necessary)
3. We can talk about parts of things: - we can talk about things in general, and
- we can say about any things that they can be divided or analyzed (to be viewed more precisely; we can add features)
4. We can talk about things negatively: - we use some kind of a edge situations or events - any further talk about them won't give or produce us any new info
- we use special add-words to mark that blocking edge situations
As the result general and things about things talks appears in universal positive statements, adding negative marks - in universal negations; talks of parts of things - in particular positive or negative (depending on if 'negation' is added).
So, thoughts are what they are, because the rest is what has no importance in our heads, or it cannot be resulted in anything else. We can operate those thoughts (or similar; or combinations of them), but we don't need other ones, our brains don't download them. Briefly said: our minds have their own architecture that install only relevant thoughts to it.
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Post by jonbain on May 13, 2023 9:21:50 GMT
No really important which size of A, or B we've got in our brains or in our mind (whatever). It's most important that we can say about A or B that A is bigger, or smaller, than B (or equal to each other). And it's also important that we cannot start with no A or B. Why with A or B? The thing is that without two or more elements we would never know about A or B solely. A must be defined relatively to B, and B to A. So, we start from something, and we use plain predicates to compare things in our heads. By that logic we can compare things respectively to their disposition or location, and to their timing. The first is space, and 2nd is time. If one thing is in another one, then we've got some kind of a plainest map or them - their location. If we know that A comes first, and then comes B, then we know the primitive scenario about the time. Then space and time may be expanded or widen; the same is about time - we may increase the number of events. 1. We talk about things in general: - we don't care about size or many other circumstantial or non-important features of things
- taking one thing as an example we can say about all of them which are alike it
2. We talk about one thing using others: - we aim at a characteristic (a verb, or an adjective) that allows us to place things
- it's a simple way to say about many things using such a type that allows to say about more (if necessary)
3. We can talk about parts of things: - we can talk about things in general, and
- we can say about any things that they can be divided or analyzed (to be viewed more precisely; we can add features)
4. We can talk about things negatively: - we use some kind of a edge situations or events - any further talk about them won't give or produce us any new info
- we use special add-words to mark that blocking edge situations
As the result general and things about things talks appears in universal positive statements, adding negative marks - in universal negations; talks of parts of things - in particular positive or negative (depending on if 'negation' is added).
So, thoughts are what they are, because the rest is what has no importance in our heads, or it cannot be resulted in anything else. We can operate those thoughts (or similar; or combinations of them), but we don't need other ones, our brains don't download them. Briefly said: our minds have their own architecture that install only relevant thoughts to it.
Time you say.
Is that according to Newton, Planck, or that Albert person?
Or perhaps a mishmash of Planck and Albert, that pretends to be logical?
For Kant, Newtonian time would have been virtually axiomatic.
And the concept of causality hangs on how time operates.
So to deal with Kantian concepts on time, requires a resolution of post-Kantian pseudo-science.
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Post by Eugene 2.0 on May 15, 2023 17:18:48 GMT
No really important which size of A, or B we've got in our brains or in our mind (whatever). It's most important that we can say about A or B that A is bigger, or smaller, than B (or equal to each other). And it's also important that we cannot start with no A or B. Why with A or B? The thing is that without two or more elements we would never know about A or B solely. A must be defined relatively to B, and B to A. So, we start from something, and we use plain predicates to compare things in our heads. By that logic we can compare things respectively to their disposition or location, and to their timing. The first is space, and 2nd is time. If one thing is in another one, then we've got some kind of a plainest map or them - their location. If we know that A comes first, and then comes B, then we know the primitive scenario about the time. Then space and time may be expanded or widen; the same is about time - we may increase the number of events. 1. We talk about things in general: - we don't care about size or many other circumstantial or non-important features of things
- taking one thing as an example we can say about all of them which are alike it
2. We talk about one thing using others: - we aim at a characteristic (a verb, or an adjective) that allows us to place things
- it's a simple way to say about many things using such a type that allows to say about more (if necessary)
3. We can talk about parts of things: - we can talk about things in general, and
- we can say about any things that they can be divided or analyzed (to be viewed more precisely; we can add features)
4. We can talk about things negatively: - we use some kind of a edge situations or events - any further talk about them won't give or produce us any new info
- we use special add-words to mark that blocking edge situations
As the result general and things about things talks appears in universal positive statements, adding negative marks - in universal negations; talks of parts of things - in particular positive or negative (depending on if 'negation' is added).
So, thoughts are what they are, because the rest is what has no importance in our heads, or it cannot be resulted in anything else. We can operate those thoughts (or similar; or combinations of them), but we don't need other ones, our brains don't download them. Briefly said: our minds have their own architecture that install only relevant thoughts to it.
Time you say.
Is that according to Newton, Planck, or that Albert person?
Or perhaps a mishmash of Planck and Albert, that pretends to be logical?
For Kant, Newtonian time would have been virtually axiomatic.
And the concept of causality hangs on how time operates.
So to deal with Kantian concepts on time, requires a resolution of post-Kantian pseudo-science.
Kant wrote some articles on Physics, but I never read them. His work "Critique of Pure Reason" is almost all what I read from him. I don't think he's got a good theory on this, because at least Schopenhauer criticies Kant for his barely naive theory. As far as I know Schopenhauer says something like this until another changes occurs there is a lot of 'time'. What does it mean? For example, if there are two lines a and b, until a crosses b, no changes occur. As soon as a crosses b there's a change (a differentiation). So, anything can happen unless a crosses b. This is a point, I guess Kant hadn't noticed it then. And this is what makes his theory be quite complicated without any positive resolutions on it. What matters is that Kant wrote something on Newton, however it seems his interest was more oriented toward Leibniz. In "Critique of Pure Reason" Kant not once pays attention to Leibniz. I know that Leibniz version was different to Newton, but I don't know how exactly. It is what, I'm sure, you can deal with, and to understand it. Even if I tried to read about it, I wouldn't go far. I sincerely tried to read Newton's "Philosophia Naturalis Principia Mathematica" then in 2014. It was not easy for me, not at all. The introduction was all what I could get, and then my mind started melting, becuase the way how Newton explained things was closer to the classics as Euclid or Ptolemy. (By the way, few first pages of Ptolemy's "Almagest" I could pass, not like Euclid's "The Elements".) Physics is difficult to me as well as metaphysics on time. Surely the basics aren't so tough to get, while to get it clear I have to know more - the more additional info to this. Let's say I can dive into Kantian's categories, but there's the insurance if I can find myself somewhere among those einsteinian's freaky indoctrination? That's why I try to swim somewhere in the neutral waters. Also I don't even know if Kant took Newtonian Physics as axioms. I just don't know here much. However, I suspect that Kantian version has some tendencies to go far from objectivity, and to get closer and closer to some kind of a subjective time or something. This may occur. Yes, it may. I also don't think that things in reality are able to create time. This would be quite a weird look I guess. Time is not what is inherent to object or derive from it, but it exist some kind of separated from them; independntly? Something like this. Well, as I said I don't know much here. |
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Post by jonbain on May 16, 2023 14:17:03 GMT
Time you say.
Is that according to Newton, Planck, or that Albert person?
Or perhaps a mishmash of Planck and Albert, that pretends to be logical?
For Kant, Newtonian time would have been virtually axiomatic.
And the concept of causality hangs on how time operates.
So to deal with Kantian concepts on time, requires a resolution of post-Kantian pseudo-science.
Kant wrote some articles on Physics, but I never read them. His work "Critique of Pure Reason" is almost all what I read from him. I don't think he's got a good theory on this, because at least Schopenhauer criticies Kant for his barely naive theory. As far as I know Schopenhauer says something like this until another changes occurs there is a lot of 'time'. What does it mean? For example, if there are two lines a and b, until a crosses b, no changes occur. As soon as a crosses b there's a change (a differentiation). So, anything can happen unless a crosses b. This is a point, I guess Kant hadn't noticed it then. And this is what makes his theory be quite complicated without any positive resolutions on it. What matters is that Kant wrote something on Newton, however it seems his interest was more oriented toward Leibniz. In "Critique of Pure Reason" Kant not once pays attention to Leibniz. I know that Leibniz version was different to Newton, but I don't know how exactly. It is what, I'm sure, you can deal with, and to understand it. Even if I tried to read about it, I wouldn't go far. I sincerely tried to read Newton's "Philosophia Naturalis Principia Mathematica" then in 2014. It was not easy for me, not at all. The introduction was all what I could get, and then my mind started melting, becuase the way how Newton explained things was closer to the classics as Euclid or Ptolemy. (By the way, few first pages of Ptolemy's "Almagest" I could pass, not like Euclid's "The Elements".) Physics is difficult to me as well as metaphysics on time. Surely the basics aren't so tough to get, while to get it clear I have to know more - the more additional info to this. Let's say I can dive into Kantian's categories, but there's the insurance if I can find myself somewhere among those einsteinian's freaky indoctrination? That's why I try to swim somewhere in the neutral waters. Also I don't even know if Kant took Newtonian Physics as axioms. I just don't know here much. However, I suspect that Kantian version has some tendencies to go far from objectivity, and to get closer and closer to some kind of a subjective time or something. This may occur. Yes, it may. I also don't think that things in reality are able to create time. This would be quite a weird look I guess. Time is not what is inherent to object or derive from it, but it exist some kind of separated from them; independntly? Something like this. Well, as I said I don't know much here. I often take long walks, and when its a new walk, it seems to take forever. But if its a known journey, then even 4 hours can go past quite quickly.
When I decide to take a new route, am I in fact creating time? Subjective time is also thus a measurement of change which is actually different to objective time.
But I shall say this again, when you start to put the math and logic into a computer language, then it COMPELS you to eradicated much of the nonsense theories.
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Post by Eugene 2.0 on May 16, 2023 15:10:25 GMT
Kant wrote some articles on Physics, but I never read them. His work "Critique of Pure Reason" is almost all what I read from him. I don't think he's got a good theory on this, because at least Schopenhauer criticies Kant for his barely naive theory. As far as I know Schopenhauer says something like this until another changes occurs there is a lot of 'time'. What does it mean? For example, if there are two lines a and b, until a crosses b, no changes occur. As soon as a crosses b there's a change (a differentiation). So, anything can happen unless a crosses b. This is a point, I guess Kant hadn't noticed it then. And this is what makes his theory be quite complicated without any positive resolutions on it. What matters is that Kant wrote something on Newton, however it seems his interest was more oriented toward Leibniz. In "Critique of Pure Reason" Kant not once pays attention to Leibniz. I know that Leibniz version was different to Newton, but I don't know how exactly. It is what, I'm sure, you can deal with, and to understand it. Even if I tried to read about it, I wouldn't go far. I sincerely tried to read Newton's "Philosophia Naturalis Principia Mathematica" then in 2014. It was not easy for me, not at all. The introduction was all what I could get, and then my mind started melting, becuase the way how Newton explained things was closer to the classics as Euclid or Ptolemy. (By the way, few first pages of Ptolemy's "Almagest" I could pass, not like Euclid's "The Elements".) Physics is difficult to me as well as metaphysics on time. Surely the basics aren't so tough to get, while to get it clear I have to know more - the more additional info to this. Let's say I can dive into Kantian's categories, but there's the insurance if I can find myself somewhere among those einsteinian's freaky indoctrination? That's why I try to swim somewhere in the neutral waters. Also I don't even know if Kant took Newtonian Physics as axioms. I just don't know here much. However, I suspect that Kantian version has some tendencies to go far from objectivity, and to get closer and closer to some kind of a subjective time or something. This may occur. Yes, it may. I also don't think that things in reality are able to create time. This would be quite a weird look I guess. Time is not what is inherent to object or derive from it, but it exist some kind of separated from them; independntly? Something like this. Well, as I said I don't know much here. I often take long walks, and when its a new walk, it seems to take forever. But if its a known journey, then even 4 hours can go past quite quickly.
When I decide to take a new route, am I in fact creating time? Subjective time is also thus a measurement of change which is actually different to objective time.
But I shall say this again, when you start to put the math and logic into a computer language, then it COMPELS you to eradicated much of the nonsense theories.
Since I'm unfamiliar with computer languages (at least only on surface) do I need to understand them as some kind of a computable systems? There was a discussion few years ago between two people in one forum, and they guessed if knowledge was computable. What by the way computability means? Is it a series of the theorems? Computers are usually to solve tasks formally, and to produce successful metaphors or poetical description. Through tales, novels, and stories the world is seen not so angularly, but along with that it may be viewed quite awkwardly and unpleasant. By that last passage I tried to say that computers allow us to get the result or to achieve the entailment, however in stories and even the everyday talks we meet the reality rather emotionally: as it happens when a reporter or a director wants us to lure into the very heart of the events, to take part in that, not only to present a brief news line. |
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Post by jonbain on May 16, 2023 20:31:48 GMT
I often take long walks, and when its a new walk, it seems to take forever. But if its a known journey, then even 4 hours can go past quite quickly.
When I decide to take a new route, am I in fact creating time? Subjective time is also thus a measurement of change which is actually different to objective time.
But I shall say this again, when you start to put the math and logic into a computer language, then it COMPELS you to eradicated much of the nonsense theories.
Since I'm unfamiliar with computer languages (at least only on surface) do I need to understand them as some kind of a computable systems? There was a discussion few years ago between two people in one forum, and they guessed if knowledge was computable. What by the way computability means? Is it a series of the theorems? Computers are usually to solve tasks formally, and to produce successful metaphors or poetical description. Through tales, novels, and stories the world is seen not so angularly, but along with that it may be viewed quite awkwardly and unpleasant. By that last passage I tried to say that computers allow us to get the result or to achieve the entailment, however in stories and even the everyday talks we meet the reality rather emotionally: as it happens when a reporter or a director wants us to lure into the very heart of the events, to take part in that, not only to present a brief news line. Its virtually impossible to describe what a computer language is, as they are effectively without limit, and are an expression of imagination, just like normal language.
They can be used to communicate just about anything, but any theory involving math or logic and TIME, needs to be expressed as an algorithm in order to eliminate illogical thinking.
For myself as Psychologist and Philosopher, the computer is a logical training device, that forces me to ensure that formulae in physics are genuine math, and not pseudo-science that produce contradictions.
So its the effect programming has on the mind that is its most powerful use. I would even suggest that in the future being unable to write an algorithm would effectively bar people from entering university, much like being unable to read or write does today.
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Post by xxxxxxxxx on May 17, 2023 22:28:31 GMT
Time is just space within space. The gap between A turning into B is a space in which other forms occur. These 'other forms' are spaces themselves thus time is just a form within a form as a space within a space. This gap in which the other forms, spaces that is, occur before A turns into B, is a space composes of forms (spaces).
A form is space as evidenced by a circle. There is an inner space, an outer space and the space between the inner and outer space as the form, in this case the circle, itself. Form is just space contradicting itself.
Thought is the same thing; There is what composes the thought, what the thought composes, and the thing between what is composed of and what composes.
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Post by Eugene 2.0 on May 18, 2023 15:58:46 GMT
Time is just space within space. The gap between A turning into B is a space in which other forms occur. These 'other forms' are spaces themselves thus time is just a form within a form as a space within a space. This gap in which the other forms, spaces that is, occur before A turns into B, is a space composes of forms (spaces). A form is space as evidenced by a circle. There is an inner space, an outer space and the space between the inner and outer space as the form, in this case the circle, itself. Form is just space contradicting itself. Thought is the same thing; There is what composes the thought, what the thought composes, and the thing between what is composed of and what composes. As for me thoughts are formless. Why am I sure in it? First of all, thoughts are constructed in quite a similar way as propositions, however it only might be an attempt to describe it. Or else, it's one of the best closer description of a thought, not the clear and sharp one. Okay, so if it is as proposition it can say about something. About which something? - Anything. Let's look at the example that illustrates that any attempt to capture that something isn't clear: Imagine an image, and on that image a black woman is holding a chocolate plate, she is in front of some cafe which sign says "Chocolate", and the name of this imagine is "Chocolate". So, to what "chocolate" refer to? We can say to a plate of chocolate, or to a cafe, or even to a black woman, or maybe to all of the items, or only certain items, or maybe it refers to some kind of a bad joke... We don't know. We cannot say clearly. We don't even know to what we're referring when we use propositions aka thoughts. Since that something in propositions may be whatever, thoughts are dim and formless. |
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Post by xxxxxxxxx on May 24, 2023 19:42:00 GMT
Time is just space within space. The gap between A turning into B is a space in which other forms occur. These 'other forms' are spaces themselves thus time is just a form within a form as a space within a space. This gap in which the other forms, spaces that is, occur before A turns into B, is a space composes of forms (spaces). A form is space as evidenced by a circle. There is an inner space, an outer space and the space between the inner and outer space as the form, in this case the circle, itself. Form is just space contradicting itself. Thought is the same thing; There is what composes the thought, what the thought composes, and the thing between what is composed of and what composes. As for me thoughts are formless. Why am I sure in it? First of all, thoughts are constructed in quite a similar way as propositions, however it only might be an attempt to describe it. Or else, it's one of the best closer description of a thought, not the clear and sharp one. Okay, so if it is as proposition it can say about something. About which something? - Anything. Let's look at the example that illustrates that any attempt to capture that something isn't clear: Imagine an image, and on that image a black woman is holding a chocolate plate, she is in front of some cafe which sign says "Chocolate", and the name of this imagine is "Chocolate". So, to what "chocolate" refer to? We can say to a plate of chocolate, or to a cafe, or even to a black woman, or maybe to all of the items, or only certain items, or maybe it refers to some kind of a bad joke... We don't know. We cannot say clearly. We don't even know to what we're referring when we use propositions aka thoughts. Since that something in propositions may be whatever, thoughts are dim and formless. 1. "Thoughts" is plural and as plural necessitates a distinction that allows on thought to stand apart from another thought for this plurality to occur. 2. "Thought" is singular and without any comparison is formless. 3. "Thoughts" is relative. "Thought" is absolute (as it is without change as no-thingness cannot change for there is nothing to change). |
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