Post by xxxxxxxxx on Jan 6, 2023 19:29:37 GMT
Morality is the path of action to fulfil a certain set of values and yet the nature of morality is ambiguous as evidenced by the multiplicity of values which exist. There is no universal rule to determine what is to be valued and what is not to be valued. The only common denominator in the question of “what is to be valued?” is that which is valued is that which leaves the deepest imprint on the observer. Intensity of impression leaves morality on somewhat irrational grounds in the respect that this intensity of impression is beyond reason as intensity is irrational given it cannot be measured objectively but only subjectively rated. Given this irrational nature, morality is fundamentally grounded through the revelation of personal experience. Revelation is thus the foundations of any moral system and this is further evidenced by the plentitude of different religions being guided by the revelations of its founders as well as the more secularly approved movement where the personal revelatory experience of trial and error in trying to determine right from wrong molds personal values.
These ‘fundamentals’ of morality being fundamentally subjective imply morality as strictly subjective but this contradictorily is not the case in the respect that values can be shared. This sharing necessitates an objective state to the phenomenon known as morality. Morality is thus both subjective and objective and yet this dualism does not lead us to any clearer notion as to what morality is or even what it should or should not be. To question morality is to place value on the question itself thus leaving us to question whether or not morality should be questioned. To question the question of morality is in itself moral in the respect that a value is placed first and foremost as the guiding point of observation, this value of course being found within the question itself. This questioning of morality as a moral value leads to a self-referentiality however and self-referentiality leads to no real direction beyond itself thus paradoxically making the question of morality as obscure.
Given the value of the question of morality is in itself a value, whether subjective or objective, we are left with morality being relative in many respects given the value behind a moral system is not only subject to the observer but ‘value’ itself is the measuring point behind all moral actions. ‘Value’ is what everything spins around. However on the other hand, ‘morality as determined by values’ is a fixed point of measurement thus is fundamentally absolute in the respect of this ‘fixed’ state. This is of course assumed given the definition of “morality as a path of action to fulfill a certain set of values” holds true as even this can be questioned in light of other definitions. Because morality is subject to a multiplicity of definitions, and values for that matter if ‘value’ is to be the fixed definition of morality, an ambiguous set of contradictions ensues as anything can be justified as anything can be valued. Other than the ‘intensity of imprint’ that guides a value system, there is no real rule or even moral code, paradoxically, for determining what should be valued or what should not. In these respects morality takes on a very spontaneous nature and has an element of chance or randomness associated with it assuming everything is not strictly determined and free will endures. However, in the other respect, a strict deterministic view of the universe still leads morality into question in the respect that the multiplicity of values, which lead to contradiction because of said multiplicity in difference, would be determined. From this perspective it is determined that there is a multiplicity of values thus a contradiction is determined therefore leading to a state where ‘anything goes’.
There are thus two ways of addressing morality, one from a freedom of will in determining values and the other way where values are determined for the observer. This is a contradiction at first glance as the two extremes of free will and determinism are contrasting and clashing opposites. But is this contradiction necessary? Not really, even though it does exist:
1. If everything is determined then the phenomenon of free will, as discussed and pointed to, is determined to exist thus free will exists.
2. If everything is free will then the phenomenon of determinism is an expression of the will, as it (i.e. determinism) is discussed and pointed to, thus determinism exists.
Dually:
1. Free will requires a series of actions to result from the choice presented, these actions are determined by the will.
2. Determinism requires as starting point to all actions and this starting point can be observed as any and everything thus necessitating a freedom of choice in observing the cause which precedes the effects.
Under these observations morality is both deterministic and an act of free will thus leaving us to a paradox or in other terms a ‘united contradiction’. The fluidity in which free will and determined action affect each other results in further ambiguity as to how morality manifests itself as even the above arguments are a reflection of values, in this case that of the writer of this argument. Value becomes not only a hinge term to the definition of morality but one which is accepted as self-evident. This ‘self-evidence’ resorts to further problems, however, when questioning value as the value behind the definition of ‘self-evidence’ is subject to the irrational intensity of impression that determines the definition taking place precisely because it is a value. Self-evidence, however it is defined, is thus subject to free will, determinism, both or even neither. This leads us to the answer of the question of self-evidence itself meaning fundamentally any and everything; the question of ‘value’ becomes obscure as the ‘self-evidence’ which defines it becomes obscure.
In these respects morality is fundamentally ambiguous when subject to any in depth questioning and cannot be reasoned with or through without resulting in contradiction or paradox. To avoid contradiction or paradox morality has not only to be ignored as a question but left to reveal itself however it is to be revealed. It is to be accept as that which is. Morality, in other terms, is a revelatory experience as values are revealed by intensity of impression be it the individual or the group. As revelatory the nature of value is impressed on the psyche by the forms of this reality; in other terms that which has form is that which impresses itself. These forms may be abstract, such as the logical forms of the laws of logic, or empirical, such as the form of a person giving donations to a charity. However this nature of form guiding the revelatory process of impression is in itself relative given forms are relative. This relativity necessitates contrast and this contrast is contradiction. An example of this is the form, or forms, which occur in the act of giving to a charity. This stands in starch contrast to the form of an individual, or individuals, ignoring a charity. Under these terms the form which imprints itself on the psyche does so in contradiction to its polar opposite. In another manner of speaking the imprinting of forms, to determine values, relies upon a contradiction within the process thus always resulting in a relative good and a relative evil.
The relative good and relative evil are subject to the observer thus mandating further contradiction as what may be good under one context is evil under another and vice versa. Each moral action, as determined by the values which precede it, is thus both good and evil. Even this statement of moral actions being both good and evil is in itself good and evil as it is relative. But this relativity contradicts itself as well as not only is an absolute statement of morality it being made, which must be a moral action (i.e. the making of the statement) as well given the statement is determined by values, but the contextual nature of morality necessitates the context through which the behavior is justified as absolute (i.e. ‘x’ is right under one context but wrong in another). In these respects morality goes down a rode of further confusion by its absolute and relative nature. To delve deeper into the rabbit hole the question of good and evil, as determined by the impression of values through the impression of forms, makes good and evil fundamentally taking on the same nature as value itself….ambiguity.
The ambiguous, if not mysterious, nature of morality is beyond question as the nature of morality to be questioned lends itself to absurdity. Morality as a way of fulfilling values is no morality at all, given the contradictory nature of value impression, thus leaving the question of ‘being’, as determined by morality, as one of a movement towards no-thingness or a cessation of impression of forms. This previous sentence may make little sense and may be observed from another perspective:
1. Morality is dependent upon forms.
2. Forms are relative.
3. Morality is thus relative.
4. This relativity necessitates contradiction.
5. Morality is thus contradictory.
6. To avoid contradiction one must avoid the dependency upon forms.
7. This necessitates one must stop receiving impressions.
8. To stop receiving impressions one must become an empty observer.
9. The state of being an empty observer is one of a cessation of values.
10. The cessation of values is the cessation of the individual will.
11. The cessation of the individual will is a movement towards ‘no-thingness’.
12. ‘No-thingness’ is absolute, as it is unchanging, considering there is no-thing to change.
13. The individual must become no-thing.
Under a third perspective: the contradictory nature of morality, as both relative and absolute, necessitates a movement beyond morality as a movement beyond the aforementioned contradiction. This post-moral state is no-thingness and not only is beyond the contextual nature of reality but in itself is the universal context which embodies everything as formlessness precedes the self-referentiality of repeated forms. In these respects one does not move beyond the contradiction but becomes the contradiction by accepting all of reality for its ‘as is-ness’ while taking no part of it in the respect of holding no fixed values which only promote the contradictory and paradoxical dichotomy of absoluteness and relativity. In ceasing to take values one ceases to take part in the illusionary forms that constitute that which we sense. Under these respects to be post moral is to move beyond the senses, that result in values thus the aforementioned morality, and to cultivate an inner sense of stillness and tranquility while manifesting a non-judgmental faith that reality should be as it is.
Morality, in its universal form of holding the universal value of being, is a movement beyond judgement which in turn is a movement beyond the dichotomous nature we know as being through the dichotomous nature of value placement. Morality is thus everything and nothing and we embody this universal nature by valuing everything thus paradoxically valuing nothing as the self-referentiality and absence of comparison found in everything is in fact nothing.
These ‘fundamentals’ of morality being fundamentally subjective imply morality as strictly subjective but this contradictorily is not the case in the respect that values can be shared. This sharing necessitates an objective state to the phenomenon known as morality. Morality is thus both subjective and objective and yet this dualism does not lead us to any clearer notion as to what morality is or even what it should or should not be. To question morality is to place value on the question itself thus leaving us to question whether or not morality should be questioned. To question the question of morality is in itself moral in the respect that a value is placed first and foremost as the guiding point of observation, this value of course being found within the question itself. This questioning of morality as a moral value leads to a self-referentiality however and self-referentiality leads to no real direction beyond itself thus paradoxically making the question of morality as obscure.
Given the value of the question of morality is in itself a value, whether subjective or objective, we are left with morality being relative in many respects given the value behind a moral system is not only subject to the observer but ‘value’ itself is the measuring point behind all moral actions. ‘Value’ is what everything spins around. However on the other hand, ‘morality as determined by values’ is a fixed point of measurement thus is fundamentally absolute in the respect of this ‘fixed’ state. This is of course assumed given the definition of “morality as a path of action to fulfill a certain set of values” holds true as even this can be questioned in light of other definitions. Because morality is subject to a multiplicity of definitions, and values for that matter if ‘value’ is to be the fixed definition of morality, an ambiguous set of contradictions ensues as anything can be justified as anything can be valued. Other than the ‘intensity of imprint’ that guides a value system, there is no real rule or even moral code, paradoxically, for determining what should be valued or what should not. In these respects morality takes on a very spontaneous nature and has an element of chance or randomness associated with it assuming everything is not strictly determined and free will endures. However, in the other respect, a strict deterministic view of the universe still leads morality into question in the respect that the multiplicity of values, which lead to contradiction because of said multiplicity in difference, would be determined. From this perspective it is determined that there is a multiplicity of values thus a contradiction is determined therefore leading to a state where ‘anything goes’.
There are thus two ways of addressing morality, one from a freedom of will in determining values and the other way where values are determined for the observer. This is a contradiction at first glance as the two extremes of free will and determinism are contrasting and clashing opposites. But is this contradiction necessary? Not really, even though it does exist:
1. If everything is determined then the phenomenon of free will, as discussed and pointed to, is determined to exist thus free will exists.
2. If everything is free will then the phenomenon of determinism is an expression of the will, as it (i.e. determinism) is discussed and pointed to, thus determinism exists.
Dually:
1. Free will requires a series of actions to result from the choice presented, these actions are determined by the will.
2. Determinism requires as starting point to all actions and this starting point can be observed as any and everything thus necessitating a freedom of choice in observing the cause which precedes the effects.
Under these observations morality is both deterministic and an act of free will thus leaving us to a paradox or in other terms a ‘united contradiction’. The fluidity in which free will and determined action affect each other results in further ambiguity as to how morality manifests itself as even the above arguments are a reflection of values, in this case that of the writer of this argument. Value becomes not only a hinge term to the definition of morality but one which is accepted as self-evident. This ‘self-evidence’ resorts to further problems, however, when questioning value as the value behind the definition of ‘self-evidence’ is subject to the irrational intensity of impression that determines the definition taking place precisely because it is a value. Self-evidence, however it is defined, is thus subject to free will, determinism, both or even neither. This leads us to the answer of the question of self-evidence itself meaning fundamentally any and everything; the question of ‘value’ becomes obscure as the ‘self-evidence’ which defines it becomes obscure.
In these respects morality is fundamentally ambiguous when subject to any in depth questioning and cannot be reasoned with or through without resulting in contradiction or paradox. To avoid contradiction or paradox morality has not only to be ignored as a question but left to reveal itself however it is to be revealed. It is to be accept as that which is. Morality, in other terms, is a revelatory experience as values are revealed by intensity of impression be it the individual or the group. As revelatory the nature of value is impressed on the psyche by the forms of this reality; in other terms that which has form is that which impresses itself. These forms may be abstract, such as the logical forms of the laws of logic, or empirical, such as the form of a person giving donations to a charity. However this nature of form guiding the revelatory process of impression is in itself relative given forms are relative. This relativity necessitates contrast and this contrast is contradiction. An example of this is the form, or forms, which occur in the act of giving to a charity. This stands in starch contrast to the form of an individual, or individuals, ignoring a charity. Under these terms the form which imprints itself on the psyche does so in contradiction to its polar opposite. In another manner of speaking the imprinting of forms, to determine values, relies upon a contradiction within the process thus always resulting in a relative good and a relative evil.
The relative good and relative evil are subject to the observer thus mandating further contradiction as what may be good under one context is evil under another and vice versa. Each moral action, as determined by the values which precede it, is thus both good and evil. Even this statement of moral actions being both good and evil is in itself good and evil as it is relative. But this relativity contradicts itself as well as not only is an absolute statement of morality it being made, which must be a moral action (i.e. the making of the statement) as well given the statement is determined by values, but the contextual nature of morality necessitates the context through which the behavior is justified as absolute (i.e. ‘x’ is right under one context but wrong in another). In these respects morality goes down a rode of further confusion by its absolute and relative nature. To delve deeper into the rabbit hole the question of good and evil, as determined by the impression of values through the impression of forms, makes good and evil fundamentally taking on the same nature as value itself….ambiguity.
The ambiguous, if not mysterious, nature of morality is beyond question as the nature of morality to be questioned lends itself to absurdity. Morality as a way of fulfilling values is no morality at all, given the contradictory nature of value impression, thus leaving the question of ‘being’, as determined by morality, as one of a movement towards no-thingness or a cessation of impression of forms. This previous sentence may make little sense and may be observed from another perspective:
1. Morality is dependent upon forms.
2. Forms are relative.
3. Morality is thus relative.
4. This relativity necessitates contradiction.
5. Morality is thus contradictory.
6. To avoid contradiction one must avoid the dependency upon forms.
7. This necessitates one must stop receiving impressions.
8. To stop receiving impressions one must become an empty observer.
9. The state of being an empty observer is one of a cessation of values.
10. The cessation of values is the cessation of the individual will.
11. The cessation of the individual will is a movement towards ‘no-thingness’.
12. ‘No-thingness’ is absolute, as it is unchanging, considering there is no-thing to change.
13. The individual must become no-thing.
Under a third perspective: the contradictory nature of morality, as both relative and absolute, necessitates a movement beyond morality as a movement beyond the aforementioned contradiction. This post-moral state is no-thingness and not only is beyond the contextual nature of reality but in itself is the universal context which embodies everything as formlessness precedes the self-referentiality of repeated forms. In these respects one does not move beyond the contradiction but becomes the contradiction by accepting all of reality for its ‘as is-ness’ while taking no part of it in the respect of holding no fixed values which only promote the contradictory and paradoxical dichotomy of absoluteness and relativity. In ceasing to take values one ceases to take part in the illusionary forms that constitute that which we sense. Under these respects to be post moral is to move beyond the senses, that result in values thus the aforementioned morality, and to cultivate an inner sense of stillness and tranquility while manifesting a non-judgmental faith that reality should be as it is.
Morality, in its universal form of holding the universal value of being, is a movement beyond judgement which in turn is a movement beyond the dichotomous nature we know as being through the dichotomous nature of value placement. Morality is thus everything and nothing and we embody this universal nature by valuing everything thus paradoxically valuing nothing as the self-referentiality and absence of comparison found in everything is in fact nothing.