Post by xxxxxxxxx on Dec 9, 2022 0:32:43 GMT
(Page 1 post 3)The foundations of relativity are absolutes thus leading to a contradiction given relativity contains within it its contrasting opposite. The observation “‘x’ occurs only through the context of ‘y’ necessitates an absolute truth. It is absolute as this relationship is unchanging. In these respects all relative observations are absolutes given certain phenomena only occur within the realm of certain other phenomena. This ‘if/only’ nature of phenomena relating necessitates an unchanging truth thus leaving relativity to negate itself for absolutism.
A contradiction results from this in the opposite respect that what is absolute is expressed a variety of ways thus leading it to contain its contrasting opposite known as relativism. The observation “‘x’ occurs through ‘y’, ‘z’, ‘y1’, ‘z1’, etc.” necessitates relative truth. It is relative as this absolute truth, i.e. the constant ‘x’ in this case, changes contexts of expression. In these respects all absolute observations are relative given an absolute truth expresses itself through a variety contexts which change according to the angle of the observer. This nature of ‘occurring through’ found in phenomena in the expression of an absolute is a changing truth thus leaving absolutism to negate itself for relativity.
In both of the arguments above it can be deduced that while relativism and absolutism are contrasting opposites these opposites exist through each other thus leading to non-sensical conclusions that open the doors to doubt over the nature of truth. This doubt cannot be doubted, or can it?
To doubt means a separation of truth from the observer as what is doubted, even though it exists as some form of a phenomenon, does not align with the observers perspective, ie it is "separated". In other terms when one doubts something they are creating a disconnect in the observation. For example, Henry doubts Santa Clause exists. Henry is observing the phenomenon known as Santa and is saying this observation does not connect with the other observations he has of reality. Santa Clause may exist as an idea only yet this idea has no empirical roots. Henry thus disassociates with the phenomenon of Santa Clause even though the fact Santa Clause can be observed as an idea necessitates some truth value in its, i.e. Santa Clause, existence. A disconnect is made.
Given doubt requires the pointing to a phenomenon a contradiction results in the respect that this pointing must first occur and gives credence to the existence of something, otherwise there would be nothing one is pointing to. That act of pointing is an act of establishing some truth and to doubt requires one to first point to something. There is no greater act of pointing than to define something as the definition of a phenomenon is to apply boundaries to it. This observation of boundaries necessitates an imprinting of the senses in the same manner that staring at a flower leaves the impression of the flower on the psyche. This impression causes the psyche to point its attention to that which is imprinting it.
To define something is to create a relationship between the observed and the observer, as stated above. However what happens when the process of description is in itself described? This leads to another contradiction as to describe description must first require description is self-evident; the thing being observed must be within the observation prior to any established relationship occurs between the observer and the observed. However if it is self-evident it does not need described much in the same manner the number 1 cannot be described as well as the simple line between two points. They are accepted for what they are without much description applied to it, if any. This absence of description is an absence of relationship as the phenomena taken as axiomatic are already within the observer’s state of being, they just ‘are’.
Now reverting back to the problem of ‘describing description’, description must first be defined before it is to be defined but it cannot be defined prior to it being defined, if it is taken as axiomatic, thus leaving that which is defined resting upon what is undefined essentially. Descriptions are just axiomatic in this respect but lose their axiomatic nature when further described. Again this leaves us with a non-sensical conclusion in the respect that in pointing to itself, description that is, it is pointing to nothing as the defined is defined through the undefined. This contradiction can be negated in favor of an infinite regress scenario at first glance. However the problem with an infinite regress is that the thing regressing is always being defined thus it actual state is dependent upon a formless potential state that is equivalent to non-existence given ‘potentiality’ is ‘non-actuality’. In other terms the perpetually undefined potential state of the regressing phenomenon leaves the defined phenomenon as resting on perpetual nothing as perpetual potentiality.
However this does not negate that the description exists and with it the act of pointing, we know this because we can point to the act of pointing and describe description (even though the base for both is groundless as discussed previously). From this it can be deduced that a phenomenon does not need grounds for it to exist, its existence is its own grounds, if they can even be called grounds at all considering its now axiomatic state is also groundless thus leading to a self-referentiality that means nothing without further things to compare with.
But how does the phenomenon known as ‘description’ relate to doubt besides the fact that both require pointing? There is nothing beyond the relationship other than the phenomenon of pointing. To doubt is to point directly at something, i.e. describe it by making a relationship between the observed and the observer, and say that that thing does not exist, i.e. its description does not exist and neither does the relationship between observer and observed. This is again non-sensical as we are pointing to something and saying we are not pointing to it, i.e. it is not describable and non-existent…and yet we still point. From this one may conclude that to doubt ‘doubt’ is the only rational way of dealing with the problem of doubt as this self-negation leaves us accepting only that ‘which is’. This leaves us effectively with everything and nothing within the field of knowledge thus the solution to doubt ends in further contradiction thus reverting back full circle to the question of doubt.
A contradiction results from this in the opposite respect that what is absolute is expressed a variety of ways thus leading it to contain its contrasting opposite known as relativism. The observation “‘x’ occurs through ‘y’, ‘z’, ‘y1’, ‘z1’, etc.” necessitates relative truth. It is relative as this absolute truth, i.e. the constant ‘x’ in this case, changes contexts of expression. In these respects all absolute observations are relative given an absolute truth expresses itself through a variety contexts which change according to the angle of the observer. This nature of ‘occurring through’ found in phenomena in the expression of an absolute is a changing truth thus leaving absolutism to negate itself for relativity.
In both of the arguments above it can be deduced that while relativism and absolutism are contrasting opposites these opposites exist through each other thus leading to non-sensical conclusions that open the doors to doubt over the nature of truth. This doubt cannot be doubted, or can it?
To doubt means a separation of truth from the observer as what is doubted, even though it exists as some form of a phenomenon, does not align with the observers perspective, ie it is "separated". In other terms when one doubts something they are creating a disconnect in the observation. For example, Henry doubts Santa Clause exists. Henry is observing the phenomenon known as Santa and is saying this observation does not connect with the other observations he has of reality. Santa Clause may exist as an idea only yet this idea has no empirical roots. Henry thus disassociates with the phenomenon of Santa Clause even though the fact Santa Clause can be observed as an idea necessitates some truth value in its, i.e. Santa Clause, existence. A disconnect is made.
Given doubt requires the pointing to a phenomenon a contradiction results in the respect that this pointing must first occur and gives credence to the existence of something, otherwise there would be nothing one is pointing to. That act of pointing is an act of establishing some truth and to doubt requires one to first point to something. There is no greater act of pointing than to define something as the definition of a phenomenon is to apply boundaries to it. This observation of boundaries necessitates an imprinting of the senses in the same manner that staring at a flower leaves the impression of the flower on the psyche. This impression causes the psyche to point its attention to that which is imprinting it.
To define something is to create a relationship between the observed and the observer, as stated above. However what happens when the process of description is in itself described? This leads to another contradiction as to describe description must first require description is self-evident; the thing being observed must be within the observation prior to any established relationship occurs between the observer and the observed. However if it is self-evident it does not need described much in the same manner the number 1 cannot be described as well as the simple line between two points. They are accepted for what they are without much description applied to it, if any. This absence of description is an absence of relationship as the phenomena taken as axiomatic are already within the observer’s state of being, they just ‘are’.
Now reverting back to the problem of ‘describing description’, description must first be defined before it is to be defined but it cannot be defined prior to it being defined, if it is taken as axiomatic, thus leaving that which is defined resting upon what is undefined essentially. Descriptions are just axiomatic in this respect but lose their axiomatic nature when further described. Again this leaves us with a non-sensical conclusion in the respect that in pointing to itself, description that is, it is pointing to nothing as the defined is defined through the undefined. This contradiction can be negated in favor of an infinite regress scenario at first glance. However the problem with an infinite regress is that the thing regressing is always being defined thus it actual state is dependent upon a formless potential state that is equivalent to non-existence given ‘potentiality’ is ‘non-actuality’. In other terms the perpetually undefined potential state of the regressing phenomenon leaves the defined phenomenon as resting on perpetual nothing as perpetual potentiality.
However this does not negate that the description exists and with it the act of pointing, we know this because we can point to the act of pointing and describe description (even though the base for both is groundless as discussed previously). From this it can be deduced that a phenomenon does not need grounds for it to exist, its existence is its own grounds, if they can even be called grounds at all considering its now axiomatic state is also groundless thus leading to a self-referentiality that means nothing without further things to compare with.
But how does the phenomenon known as ‘description’ relate to doubt besides the fact that both require pointing? There is nothing beyond the relationship other than the phenomenon of pointing. To doubt is to point directly at something, i.e. describe it by making a relationship between the observed and the observer, and say that that thing does not exist, i.e. its description does not exist and neither does the relationship between observer and observed. This is again non-sensical as we are pointing to something and saying we are not pointing to it, i.e. it is not describable and non-existent…and yet we still point. From this one may conclude that to doubt ‘doubt’ is the only rational way of dealing with the problem of doubt as this self-negation leaves us accepting only that ‘which is’. This leaves us effectively with everything and nothing within the field of knowledge thus the solution to doubt ends in further contradiction thus reverting back full circle to the question of doubt.
