|
Post by xxxxxxxxx on Oct 24, 2022 21:20:15 GMT
1. The sharing of qualities is unity. 2. Unity is the absence of separation. 3. The sharing of qualities is the absence of separation. 4. The absence of separation necessitates nothing in between phenomena as there are no distinctions. 5. Nothing between phenomena results in a void. 6. Unity is voidness.
|
|
|
Post by Eugene 2.0 on Nov 9, 2022 6:23:44 GMT
In the first three there may be a mistake, but may be none of them. It depends how to construct them:
If 1 and 2 gives 3, then 1-2-3 is the fourth figure of syllogism, but it is not correct. If 2-1-3 is the correct, then the 3 must be conversed into:
3. The absence of separation is the sharing of qualities.
The most common mistakes in logic that almost everybody does is about using language instead of the set theory and logic. 1 and 2 have to be rewritten in the set theory to clear the relatons between the parts in the sentence as in this way:
1`. A set of (sharing qualities) belongs to a set of (unity) 2`. A set of (unity) belongs to a set of (separation).
Or it may be the equality as in this:
1``. A set of (sharing qualities) = a set of (unity) 2``. A set of (unity) = a set of (separation).
Depending on which way to assume the result is different.
3`. A set of (sharing qualities) belongs to a set of (separation) 3``. A set of (sharing qualities) = a set of (separation).
|
|
|
Post by xxxxxxxxx on Nov 10, 2022 22:16:15 GMT
In the first three there may be a mistake, but may be none of them. It depends how to construct them: If 1 and 2 gives 3, then 1-2-3 is the fourth figure of syllogism, but it is not correct. If 2-1-3 is the correct, then the 3 must be conversed into: 3. The absence of separation is the sharing of qualities. The most common mistakes in logic that almost everybody does is about using language instead of the set theory and logic. 1 and 2 have to be rewritten in the set theory to clear the relatons between the parts in the sentence as in this way: 1`. A set of (sharing qualities) belongs to a set of (unity) 2`. A set of (unity) belongs to a set of (separation). Or it may be the equality as in this: 1``. A set of (sharing qualities) = a set of (unity) 2``. A set of (unity) = a set of (separation). Depending on which way to assume the result is different. 3`. A set of (sharing qualities) belongs to a set of (separation) 3``. A set of (sharing qualities) = a set of (separation). The sharing of qualities necessitates a unity between said phenonema. This unity necessitates no-thing between them as perfect unity is indistinguishable from nothingness.
|
|
|
Post by IM LITERALLY NEO on Nov 11, 2022 21:16:01 GMT
Unity Is Not Void, Unity Is Referential Without Reference, In That Aspects We Perceive As Parts Are Actual Wholly Parts. I.E Black = Absorption Of All Colors, But Is Perceived As Without Color And White Is A Refraction Of All Colors But Perceived As Without Color.
|
|
|
Post by Eugene 2.0 on Nov 14, 2022 6:54:40 GMT
In the first three there may be a mistake, but may be none of them. It depends how to construct them: If 1 and 2 gives 3, then 1-2-3 is the fourth figure of syllogism, but it is not correct. If 2-1-3 is the correct, then the 3 must be conversed into: 3. The absence of separation is the sharing of qualities. The most common mistakes in logic that almost everybody does is about using language instead of the set theory and logic. 1 and 2 have to be rewritten in the set theory to clear the relatons between the parts in the sentence as in this way: 1`. A set of (sharing qualities) belongs to a set of (unity) 2`. A set of (unity) belongs to a set of (separation). Or it may be the equality as in this: 1``. A set of (sharing qualities) = a set of (unity) 2``. A set of (unity) = a set of (separation). Depending on which way to assume the result is different. 3`. A set of (sharing qualities) belongs to a set of (separation) 3``. A set of (sharing qualities) = a set of (separation). The sharing of qualities necessitates a unity between said phenonema. This unity necessitates no-thing between them as perfect unity is indistinguishable from nothingness. By the way, this thesis of yours is almost exactly opposite to Greg Harman's ("Speculative Realism"). The philosophy school he belongs to is young (est 2007). You can use this as a material to say about this though. I mean to put some base to it. Harman said (I don't know how to translate it, I read it in Russian. I guess the paper's name is something like "Of Shifting Causation") that there is no relation between any objects without a thirty. So, the relation (causation also) is an act of the three components: two objects and a third one. Why I think Harman may be put here? "The Unity" is just a relation in term of modern math, and philosophy, so for Harman, perhaps, it requires at least three objects. In any abstract algebra it's quite the same: 'x', 'y', and some 'f'. I got your point. I guess the hard thinking brings the same: we cannot differ the unit and nothingness, only maybe theoretically, not as phenomenon. And that last one is important, because if it true (in Kantian sense), then it is theoretically impossible. Another interesting point that if your thought is closer to Kant, then it is definitely oppose to Harman's: the school he belongs to confesses anti-Kantian views. They claim if there are restrictions for any person to think about X, then it doesn't mean X doesn't exist or it is unseen for the other objects. "A cup of coffee hides something from another one" says Harman. Also, they say: if there are requirements for any person to think such and such, it doesn't mean this is fair about the objects.
|
|
|
Post by xxxxxxxxx on Nov 16, 2022 21:45:34 GMT
The sharing of qualities necessitates a unity between said phenonema. This unity necessitates no-thing between them as perfect unity is indistinguishable from nothingness. By the way, this thesis of yours is almost exactly opposite to Greg Harman's ("Speculative Realism"). The philosophy school he belongs to is young (est 2007). You can use this as a material to say about this though. I mean to put some base to it. Harman said (I don't know how to translate it, I read it in Russian. I guess the paper's name is something like "Of Shifting Causation") that there is no relation between any objects without a thirty. So, the relation (causation also) is an act of the three components: two objects and a third one. Why I think Harman may be put here? "The Unity" is just a relation in term of modern math, and philosophy, so for Harman, perhaps, it requires at least three objects. In any abstract algebra it's quite the same: 'x', 'y', and some 'f'. I got your point. I guess the hard thinking brings the same: we cannot differ the unit and nothingness, only maybe theoretically, not as phenomenon. And that last one is important, because if it true (in Kantian sense), then it is theoretically impossible. Another interesting point that if your thought is closer to Kant, then it is definitely oppose to Harman's: the school he belongs to confesses anti-Kantian views. They claim if there are restrictions for any person to think about X, then it doesn't mean X doesn't exist or it is unseen for the other objects. "A cup of coffee hides something from another one" says Harman. Also, they say: if there are requirements for any person to think such and such, it doesn't mean this is fair about the objects. All restrictions are limits thus to say something is "restricted in talking about" is to put a limit on it and paradoxically define it.
|
|
|
Post by Eugene 2.0 on Nov 16, 2022 21:58:34 GMT
By the way, this thesis of yours is almost exactly opposite to Greg Harman's ("Speculative Realism"). The philosophy school he belongs to is young (est 2007). You can use this as a material to say about this though. I mean to put some base to it. Harman said (I don't know how to translate it, I read it in Russian. I guess the paper's name is something like "Of Shifting Causation") that there is no relation between any objects without a thirty. So, the relation (causation also) is an act of the three components: two objects and a third one. Why I think Harman may be put here? "The Unity" is just a relation in term of modern math, and philosophy, so for Harman, perhaps, it requires at least three objects. In any abstract algebra it's quite the same: 'x', 'y', and some 'f'. I got your point. I guess the hard thinking brings the same: we cannot differ the unit and nothingness, only maybe theoretically, not as phenomenon. And that last one is important, because if it true (in Kantian sense), then it is theoretically impossible. Another interesting point that if your thought is closer to Kant, then it is definitely oppose to Harman's: the school he belongs to confesses anti-Kantian views. They claim if there are restrictions for any person to think about X, then it doesn't mean X doesn't exist or it is unseen for the other objects. "A cup of coffee hides something from another one" says Harman. Also, they say: if there are requirements for any person to think such and such, it doesn't mean this is fair about the objects. All restrictions are limits thus to say something is "restricted in talking about" is to put a limit on it and paradoxically define it. And this reminds of a notepad with some notes as 'this notepad has no noted on it'. Or on a letter 'there is no text on a letter'. Or, as it was in Edgar Poe's "The Leper King" a phrase written with a chalk read "there is no chalk".
|
|