Post by Eugene 2.0 on Aug 27, 2022 10:54:15 GMT
Ayer, the logical positivist, defended verification that is:
V1: If a theory T is true, that it entails true facts, or: if our theory is true, then the facts will be confirmed and performed within this theory
and:
V2: Any verified theories are scientifical
Unlike the logical positivism Popper defended falsification that is:
F1: A theory T should be accepted by us if and only if for a theory T it's possible to find such a fact that contradicts to this theory, or: our theories are correct if they can entail false propositions
and:
F2: Any falsified theories are scientifical
Actually, V1, V2, F1, and F2 are compatible, there are no big problems here. But I think that any theory is in problem, because of its semantic or model side. What is that model side? A model or semantic for a theory T is all the relevant facts which may verify or falsify it.
I postulate this:
N1: Any theory is false, when it entails only true propositions, and true if it entails not only true propositions, or: a theory should be accepted only if it is not a tautology
and:
N2: There are no models that can prove a theory
I got to explain.
Let's say there's a model M¹ and M² such that a theory T¹ is tautology on M¹, and not a tautology on M². (It's easy to memorize, because it's functional: f[(T is tautology)→(Tx=Mx)]. Or f[(Tx=My)→(T isn't a tautology)].) And each model can be represented as a set {M}. So, if Tx isn't a tautology, then it must be true that: there's a subset of a set My, such as My⊂Mx or {My}⊂{Mx}. But in this case a subset My is a complete set, and to be verified or falsified it must have another subset Mⁿ such that Mⁿ⊂My or {Mⁿ}⊂{My}. And this function has to be applied for any new theory. So, if Lim(x)[fⁿ(Tμ,Mπ) & n→∞], then there must exist such a set Mx such that for any set My {Mx}⊂{My}. So, the process is endless.
I insist to think that such a model is impossible, because it diminishes as V1 so F1, and makes V2 and F2 be dull. We cannot go to the infinite results intentionally, this is a wrong way. This requires as epistemological skepticism so
knowledge irrealism.
In other words, for any new model there must be more and more precise model, and each new model will require another new model, so this process is endless, and we will not have reached the destination to check out theory.
But we also cannot do anything to avoid it because this process is definitely logical. This means that scientists should betake to non-logical or illogical things that sounds quite crazy. This means that the scientifical process isn't completely rational...
V1: If a theory T is true, that it entails true facts, or: if our theory is true, then the facts will be confirmed and performed within this theory
and:
V2: Any verified theories are scientifical
Unlike the logical positivism Popper defended falsification that is:
F1: A theory T should be accepted by us if and only if for a theory T it's possible to find such a fact that contradicts to this theory, or: our theories are correct if they can entail false propositions
and:
F2: Any falsified theories are scientifical
Actually, V1, V2, F1, and F2 are compatible, there are no big problems here. But I think that any theory is in problem, because of its semantic or model side. What is that model side? A model or semantic for a theory T is all the relevant facts which may verify or falsify it.
I postulate this:
N1: Any theory is false, when it entails only true propositions, and true if it entails not only true propositions, or: a theory should be accepted only if it is not a tautology
and:
N2: There are no models that can prove a theory
I got to explain.
Let's say there's a model M¹ and M² such that a theory T¹ is tautology on M¹, and not a tautology on M². (It's easy to memorize, because it's functional: f[(T is tautology)→(Tx=Mx)]. Or f[(Tx=My)→(T isn't a tautology)].) And each model can be represented as a set {M}. So, if Tx isn't a tautology, then it must be true that: there's a subset of a set My, such as My⊂Mx or {My}⊂{Mx}. But in this case a subset My is a complete set, and to be verified or falsified it must have another subset Mⁿ such that Mⁿ⊂My or {Mⁿ}⊂{My}. And this function has to be applied for any new theory. So, if Lim(x)[fⁿ(Tμ,Mπ) & n→∞], then there must exist such a set Mx such that for any set My {Mx}⊂{My}. So, the process is endless.
I insist to think that such a model is impossible, because it diminishes as V1 so F1, and makes V2 and F2 be dull. We cannot go to the infinite results intentionally, this is a wrong way. This requires as epistemological skepticism so
knowledge irrealism.
In other words, for any new model there must be more and more precise model, and each new model will require another new model, so this process is endless, and we will not have reached the destination to check out theory.
But we also cannot do anything to avoid it because this process is definitely logical. This means that scientists should betake to non-logical or illogical things that sounds quite crazy. This means that the scientifical process isn't completely rational...