Post by Eugene 2.0 on Jul 12, 2021 23:18:12 GMT
(This is from my article. I put it to ggl translate, and slightly corrected. So, if there are mistakes and so on - make a note for me.)
Ontological Side of the Cartesian Proof
In his proof, Descartes tried to establish the fact of existence based on the fact of doubt. Reflecting on his own doubt, he establishes the persistence of doubt in reflection. Thus, Cartesian proof denies everything, and by denying it he establishes the positive fact of the existence of the doubtful thought he (p) deduces the existence of the one who doubts (q). Let us express this ratio by the formula:
p → q (D)
As a rule, there are two main accusations appear: 1) a formal one and 2) accusations by the complexity. The first relates mainly to both the wording and formula (D). The other relates to the transition from an epistemological attitude to an existential one. Let's dwell on each of them in more a detail way. In what follows, we'll establish that: a) there is no need to consider the formal accusations sufficient to reject the Cartesian formulation, and also that b) the incompleteness of the formal accusations obtains the possibility of a phenomenological interpretation of Descarte's formula, and, in addition, that c) from the possibility of (a) makes (b) be the inference.
(a) Against formal accusations
In fact, speaking about the formal inconsistency of the formulation, they mean that there is no need to go from p to q in a given formula (D). This formula is not analytical, but it is difficult to call it synthetic due to its introspective nature. However, we could say more definitely that 1) the words or categories used by Descartes are reserved for logical words and, therefore, give reason to talk about the presence of some objectively understood formulation there, and also that 2) the presence of semantic completeness makes the conclusion possible about the possibility of carrying out standard semantic analysis.
Denying the former, we argue that there is no need to regard the reservation of words in the Cartesian formulation as something once and for all given and, on this basis, to assume them to be perceived as the skeptics of Cartesianism want it. We could object to them, pointing out the fact that one or more of their interpretations will not be convincing in the sense that no interpretation is perfect, and even more — so in the sense of the final understanding of Descartes.
Regarding the semantic nature of Descarte's formulation, we argue that we can neither be sure that Descartes's formulation has semantic integrity, nor that, based on the fact of recognizing the integrity, we can assert about some single semantics. The latter will be demonstrated by an example of apophenia or a false perception of what in reality may not be. According to apophenia, we can see integrity where it does not exist due to various, as a rule, visual aberrations, etc. As for the possibility, proceeding from integrity, to deduce semantic certainty, it seems to be obvious to us that there is no necessary conclusion regarding this fact.
(b) Phenomenological explanation
In the previous paragraph, we concluded that formal accusations are weak for necessity, and taking this for granted we admit the possibility of interpreting the Cartesian formulation in a different way. Let's assume that Descartes' formulation has phenomenological value, so what does this mean? To begin with, I will say that the metaphysical and phenomenological parts of the formulation are in a quite sense similar; its difference becomes apparent only when we carry out the same procedure as Descartes himself.
Here it is necessary to point out several features that take place in a detailed examination of this formula. The first thing to pay attention to is a) some general fact of movement , transifion, or change , which is in the formula; b) it should further indicate that there is a transformation from one aspect of the presentation to another; c) we can also talk about the presence of something that accompanies the proof, such as: space, time, conditions, the possibility of the formulation itself, and so on; finally, d) some force, which, on the one hand, is capable of resisting everything that is either purely external or simply external, and, on the other hand, is the force of conviction regarding the fact of existence.
These four sides can be simplified (for the sake of brevity, etc.), then (a) will be the part that can be called the physical side of the formulation, (c) will be part of the causal metaphysical property, part (c) will be responsible for the resources that are required for the formulation and, therefore, will be the ontological side of the formulation, and the final (d) will be responsible for the psychological side of the issue. It turned out not very well-coordinated, but nevertheless, a clear classification. Let's go through each of the points.
In the physical respect the wording is such that involves a kind of mass or volume. Descartes is the same person who appears as a consequence of the formula (D) is something that can not occupy any volume of space or have zero mass. Indeed, we cannot talk about the absence of something that is stated in the formulation of Descartes at the same time, speaking about the absence of this conclusion. If we did that, we would get a contradiction.
The next, cause-and-effect factor gives us reason to doubt the weakness of obtaining any cause-and-effect relationship. But since total skepticism about cause-and-effect relationships is meaningless, finding effects that can be useful is important. In the formulation of Descartes, a logical cause-and-effect relationship is outlined, but is this so? As we have already indicated above, there is no logical necessity of formula (D), and, therefore, there is nothing here that would be logically necessary. And only the logically necessary can be considered as an instance of a causal relationship. Thus, we state the negative side of this situation, but we will return to it in the fourth paragraph.
Further, we are faced with an ontological problematic, which we will try to express in such a way: for Descarte's formulation to take place, some being must take place. In other words, if there is no being, then there can be no formulation of Descartes. In principle, the question of being is not posed, and it seems that we can ignore it, but in addition to being itself in the formulation (D), there is also another side, namely: we assert some doubt and this is something that we call doubt also exists. After all, it cannot be so that doubts do not exist, but the Cartesian formula has been deduced! Consequently, doubt has some ontological status. But what is that doubt? How does it manifest itself? - Descartes believes that it is something with the help of which we reject everything else. What does it mean to reject something else? What is it like? If we just stop thinking about something else, then we still do not produce anything ontologically. The same is true with regard to the doubt. If everything that we know turned out to be only an opinion, then this still does not guarantee that this opinion itself is beyond the horizon of the possibility of being criticized. Briefly, we conclude: this part needs more detailed development.
The final - psychological - moment is associated with some force that tries to destroy, and then creates itself. What is this power and why is this certain power much better, than the one that takes place in consciousness? Firstly, by now it should become obvious that instead of the usual concepts, like consciousness or doubt, we can have something, if not completely different, then, in any case, sharply different from the previously accepted attitudes. Secondly, we can also state the presence of some new logic that would make it possible to move from the previous cause-and-effect relationships of random sets to more definite ones, which may take place in the previous, ontological, case.
Regarding the last point, we will also point out at that moment that, in addition to the usual proof, this one claims to be something more, namely - such proof serves not only as a kind of self-preservation or warning, but is extremely important for anyone. It would not be wrong to compare this will with the existential one. It is the existential position that seems to be the one that seeks to break through the thickness of logical, metaphysical and other obstacles.
In a brief semi-conclusion, I would like to add that having examined the Cartesian formulation, distinguishing between formal and general criticism of this formulation, pointing out the problems of such criticism and proposing our phenomenological interpretation, we tried to justify the importance of maintaining interest in Descartes' ontological reflections.