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Post by Eugene 2.0 on Jul 12, 2021 23:18:12 GMT
(This is from my article. I put it to ggl translate, and slightly corrected. So, if there are mistakes and so on - make a note for me.)Ontological Side of the Cartesian Proof In his proof, Descartes tried to establish the fact of existence based on the fact of doubt. Reflecting on his own doubt, he establishes the persistence of doubt in reflection. Thus, Cartesian proof denies everything, and by denying it he establishes the positive fact of the existence of the doubtful thought he (p) deduces the existence of the one who doubts (q). Let us express this ratio by the formula:
p → q (D) As a rule, there are two main accusations appear: 1) a formal one and 2) accusations by the complexity. The first relates mainly to both the wording and formula (D). The other relates to the transition from an epistemological attitude to an existential one. Let's dwell on each of them in more a detail way. In what follows, we'll establish that: a) there is no need to consider the formal accusations sufficient to reject the Cartesian formulation, and also that b) the incompleteness of the formal accusations obtains the possibility of a phenomenological interpretation of Descarte's formula, and, in addition, that c) from the possibility of (a) makes (b) be the inference. (a) Against formal accusations In fact, speaking about the formal inconsistency of the formulation, they mean that there is no need to go from p to q in a given formula (D). This formula is not analytical, but it is difficult to call it synthetic due to its introspective nature. However, we could say more definitely that 1) the words or categories used by Descartes are reserved for logical words and, therefore, give reason to talk about the presence of some objectively understood formulation there, and also that 2) the presence of semantic completeness makes the conclusion possible about the possibility of carrying out standard semantic analysis. Denying the former, we argue that there is no need to regard the reservation of words in the Cartesian formulation as something once and for all given and, on this basis, to assume them to be perceived as the skeptics of Cartesianism want it. We could object to them, pointing out the fact that one or more of their interpretations will not be convincing in the sense that no interpretation is perfect, and even more — so in the sense of the final understanding of Descartes. Regarding the semantic nature of Descarte's formulation, we argue that we can neither be sure that Descartes's formulation has semantic integrity, nor that, based on the fact of recognizing the integrity, we can assert about some single semantics. The latter will be demonstrated by an example of apophenia or a false perception of what in reality may not be. According to apophenia, we can see integrity where it does not exist due to various, as a rule, visual aberrations, etc. As for the possibility, proceeding from integrity, to deduce semantic certainty, it seems to be obvious to us that there is no necessary conclusion regarding this fact. (b) Phenomenological explanation In the previous paragraph, we concluded that formal accusations are weak for necessity, and taking this for granted we admit the possibility of interpreting the Cartesian formulation in a different way. Let's assume that Descartes' formulation has phenomenological value, so what does this mean? To begin with, I will say that the metaphysical and phenomenological parts of the formulation are in a quite sense similar; its difference becomes apparent only when we carry out the same procedure as Descartes himself. Here it is necessary to point out several features that take place in a detailed examination of this formula. The first thing to pay attention to is a) some general fact of movement , transifion, or change , which is in the formula; b) it should further indicate that there is a transformation from one aspect of the presentation to another; c) we can also talk about the presence of something that accompanies the proof, such as: space, time, conditions, the possibility of the formulation itself, and so on; finally, d) some force, which, on the one hand, is capable of resisting everything that is either purely external or simply external, and, on the other hand, is the force of conviction regarding the fact of existence. These four sides can be simplified (for the sake of brevity, etc.), then (a) will be the part that can be called the physical side of the formulation, (c) will be part of the causal metaphysical property, part (c) will be responsible for the resources that are required for the formulation and, therefore, will be the ontological side of the formulation, and the final (d) will be responsible for the psychological side of the issue. It turned out not very well-coordinated, but nevertheless, a clear classification. Let's go through each of the points. In the physical respect the wording is such that involves a kind of mass or volume. Descartes is the same person who appears as a consequence of the formula (D) is something that can not occupy any volume of space or have zero mass. Indeed, we cannot talk about the absence of something that is stated in the formulation of Descartes at the same time, speaking about the absence of this conclusion. If we did that, we would get a contradiction. The next, cause-and-effect factor gives us reason to doubt the weakness of obtaining any cause-and-effect relationship. But since total skepticism about cause-and-effect relationships is meaningless, finding effects that can be useful is important. In the formulation of Descartes, a logical cause-and-effect relationship is outlined, but is this so? As we have already indicated above, there is no logical necessity of formula (D), and, therefore, there is nothing here that would be logically necessary. And only the logically necessary can be considered as an instance of a causal relationship. Thus, we state the negative side of this situation, but we will return to it in the fourth paragraph. Further, we are faced with an ontological problematic, which we will try to express in such a way: for Descarte's formulation to take place, some being must take place. In other words, if there is no being, then there can be no formulation of Descartes. In principle, the question of being is not posed, and it seems that we can ignore it, but in addition to being itself in the formulation (D), there is also another side, namely: we assert some doubt and this is something that we call doubt also exists. After all, it cannot be so that doubts do not exist, but the Cartesian formula has been deduced! Consequently, doubt has some ontological status. But what is that doubt? How does it manifest itself? - Descartes believes that it is something with the help of which we reject everything else. What does it mean to reject something else? What is it like? If we just stop thinking about something else, then we still do not produce anything ontologically. The same is true with regard to the doubt. If everything that we know turned out to be only an opinion, then this still does not guarantee that this opinion itself is beyond the horizon of the possibility of being criticized. Briefly, we conclude: this part needs more detailed development. The final - psychological - moment is associated with some force that tries to destroy, and then creates itself. What is this power and why is this certain power much better, than the one that takes place in consciousness? Firstly, by now it should become obvious that instead of the usual concepts, like consciousness or doubt, we can have something, if not completely different, then, in any case, sharply different from the previously accepted attitudes. Secondly, we can also state the presence of some new logic that would make it possible to move from the previous cause-and-effect relationships of random sets to more definite ones, which may take place in the previous, ontological, case. Regarding the last point, we will also point out at that moment that, in addition to the usual proof, this one claims to be something more, namely - such proof serves not only as a kind of self-preservation or warning, but is extremely important for anyone. It would not be wrong to compare this will with the existential one. It is the existential position that seems to be the one that seeks to break through the thickness of logical, metaphysical and other obstacles. In a brief semi-conclusion, I would like to add that having examined the Cartesian formulation, distinguishing between formal and general criticism of this formulation, pointing out the problems of such criticism and proposing our phenomenological interpretation, we tried to justify the importance of maintaining interest in Descartes' ontological reflections.
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Triangle
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Post by Triangle on Jul 13, 2021 0:52:54 GMT
It's really good but I feel something does not fit in the first paragraph.
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Triangle
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Post by Triangle on Jul 13, 2021 0:55:26 GMT
But I know nothing about mathematical logic, as I say.
The body of your text is tremendous. Congratulations.
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Post by Eugene 2.0 on Jul 13, 2021 6:52:35 GMT
But I know nothing about mathematical logic, as I say. The body of your text is tremendous. Congratulations. Thanks ;) I'm trying. It's a translation from Ukrainian, but made by ggl translator. Unfortunately, the level of English of mine is really low.
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Triangle
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Post by Triangle on Jul 16, 2021 12:57:08 GMT
But I know nothing about mathematical logic, as I say. The body of your text is tremendous. Congratulations. Thanks I'm trying. It's a translation from Ukrainian, but made by ggl translator. Unfortunately, the level of English of mine is really low. If you english are low my english are base haha; I pretend to study english grammar someday.
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Post by Eugene 2.0 on Jul 16, 2021 13:41:01 GMT
Thanks I'm trying. It's a translation from Ukrainian, but made by ggl translator. Unfortunately, the level of English of mine is really low. If you english are low my english are base haha; I pretend to study english grammar someday. The really drastic thing for me is that I started speaking for foreign language people too late. I should have started speaking with them in my 20's, while I started doing it in my 30's. I was studied it mostly by myself, because that classes were terrible. Only one-to-one direct speaking is better, than anything. I like to study English or other languages my some mostly common series "English Grammar" by Murphy. And reading books in English. My choice is Dashiel Hammeth, Mary Shelley, and Lovecraft. In Russia there's a show with a polyglot Dmitry Petrov called "Spanish in 16 Hours", "German in 16 Hours", etc, where people studied languages quickly.
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Post by joustos on Jul 16, 2021 15:43:04 GMT
Eugene, congratulations for your article. However, instead of analysing it, I'll make a couple of side remarks, which may or may not be of interest to you.// When I think of Descartes' argument for the existence of God, I think of his view that our idea of infinity cannot be produced by our finite minds;it requires an infinite being (God) as its source. Comment: Actually we are not acquainted with anything infinite; our idea of infinity is entirely negative: non-finite, non-limited, boundary-less....// I think that the argument you discuss was inspired by St. Augustine: I may not doubt that something exists, since if I doubt, I have to exist to begin with. (I doubt; therefore I am. ) Descartes' own "Cogito ergo sum"-- I am conscious, therefore I am" proved that he existed.... (I don't like to call this an "ontological" argument, since it simply exresses a "logical prerequisite"....
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Post by Eugene 2.0 on Jul 16, 2021 16:21:44 GMT
Eugene, congratulations for your article. However, instead of analysing it, I'll make a couple of side remarks, which may or may not be of interest to you.// When I think of Descartes' argument for the existence of God, I think of his view that our idea of infinity cannot be produced by our finite minds;it requires an infinite being (God) as its source. Comment: Actually we are not acquainted with anything infinite; our idea of infinity is entirely negative: non-finite, non-limited, boundary-less....// I think that the argument you discuss was inspired by St. Augustine: I may not doubt that something exists, since if I doubt, I have to exist to begin with. (I doubt; therefore I am. ) Descartes' own "Cogito ergo sum"-- I am conscious, therefore I am" proved that he existed.... (I don't like to call this an "ontological" argument, since it simply exresses a "logical prerequisite".... Oh, thanks for congratulations, but unfortunately this article hasn't moved a little since I send it. Plus, here are no quotations of any Descartes works, and this is inappropriate by mostly scientific magazines - as xxxxxxxx can confirm it. Yes, St. Augustine was first who uttered it (at least, I read it twice in Russell's "History of Western Philosophy" and "Wisdom of the West"). And in turn, may I ask you, do you know anything about Descartes using Nicola of Cusa or someone else similar ideas? I'm asking about it, because your remark of impossibility move from finite to infinite has stopped me. I was going to read Descartes's "Geometry", and with that to get acquainted with his project of the analytic geometry. I hadn't studied Cartesian philosophy as well as to be prepared to give any answers about it, except for many surfaced ones. Anyway, there I could find to some ideas about the ontological traces of Descartes's ontology. I know that more further analysis of exactly of this question has been made by E. Husserl in his "Cartesian Meditations". By this fragment all I wanted to say is that probably Descartes was going to express something more precise and intimate, than we use to think formalizing his discourse into one of logical languages. So, here are two main problems: where to start that formalizing (it's important to ask, because we can't just say that here or there this analysis should be started), and what about semantics? The last one is tied up with the previous one, because we can't even say is Descartes close to the common language philosophy or to the descriptivists schools? How he thought? - This question must be tied up with something the hermeneutics provides. Since that, I'd say that the Cartesian argument was taken rather as an example. I can't think of myself as an expert in any of the New Time (or XVII-XIX) philosophers. By the way, the idea of yours in the last sentence of your comment is quite similar to a phat fat one that has been figuring among Russell and Strawson during 40's years (I don't remember the exact time of this), and this problem is concerting the problem of reference. Russell had started in in his On Propositions (191?) and On Denoting (//" Introduction to Math Philosophy", I don't remember the year of it) where he introduced the descriptions, while later (in 40's?) Strawson doubted in that descriptions, mainly in fact of to what the definite descriptions point? And he also (along with Quine) doubted that many descriptions have the common true-value conditions (or the logical valence). Since that the discussions was continued, and there appeared (among many others) a problem about the presuppositions in not only the question-sentences, but in the other, - and further to some consciousness ideas ( J. Searle "On Referential Acts of Speech(es)"). Where I was leaning to (or what did I wanted say by this?) - I wanted to say that Descartes could hold exactly what you said - the logical prerequisites or the logical presuppositions - mainly; and what was he going to say us could be covered up by that logical form, and that essence or that extraction might be more important.
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Post by jonbain on Jul 16, 2021 16:27:00 GMT
Eugene 2.0I see no reason to use formulae in language like this ever. I reckon the philosophy is certainly analytical. I found no obvious problems in the English grammar, but it was a bit verbose. Its always been a favorite argument of mine. That people even think it can be denied at all is typically an emotional response to the implication of God in Descartes work - a subconscious guilt reaction.
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Post by Eugene 2.0 on Jul 16, 2021 16:46:00 GMT
Eugene 2.0 I see no reason to use formulae in language like this ever. I reckon the philosophy is certainly analytical. I found no obvious problems in the English grammar, but it was a bit verbose. Its always been a favorite argument of mine. That people even think it can be denied at all is typically an emotional response to the implication of God in Descartes work - a subconscious guilt reaction. Frege once said: "No appeal to intuition!". He wanted to say by this that in logic (and in math, and in many such fields) we should not to appeal to some psychology, because it would be just tricks. The most important thing is that - we cannot get rid of using psychology in logic either. Any inference or a conclusion - as well as a dot at the end of plain statements - is a part of psychological process of making accents. The same about dividing words into movable and immovable parts; or to see many words, instead of just one long statement (like it happens in many Indian languages as in Cherokee). Another problem that having as psychology so no-intuition cannot help us in problematizing logic, because either to prove logic, or to disprove it - we cannot get rid of using logic. It's the same as to try to disprove any language by using language, or - in a lesser strictly sense - to disprove one science using the same science. Seems like logic is something very intimate to us along with our own psychic processes. Anyway, even if the Cartesian formula isn't deniable, it must be proved by each one person, - and this chance allows us to suppose of having certain subjective semantics. As Joustos rightly said above that St. Augustine was using almost the same formulation before Descartes, this might also lead us to conclude that the main idea of the Cartesian argument isn't in its logical structure, but it hides. It's something very intimate. Not without reason both thinkers (St. Augustine and Descartes) was writing about their experience about this idea as something very intimate to them, something very close to their meditations - and they felt it during not only their processes or thinking, but during their processes of meditations also.
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Post by thesageofmainstreet on Jul 16, 2021 18:41:54 GMT
Eugene, congratulations for your article. However, instead of analysing it, I'll make a couple of side remarks, which may or may not be of interest to you.// When I think of Descartes' argument for the existence of God, I think of his view that our idea of infinity cannot be produced by our finite minds;it requires an infinite being (God) as its source. Comment: Actually we are not acquainted with anything infinite; our idea of infinity is entirely negative: non-finite, non-limited, boundary-less....// I think that the argument you discuss was inspired by St. Augustine: I may not doubt that something exists, since if I doubt, I have to exist to begin with. (I doubt; therefore I am. ) Descartes' own "Cogito ergo sum"-- I am conscious, therefore I am" proved that he existed.... (I don't like to call this an "ontological" argument, since it simply exresses a "logical prerequisite".... Walk Away, Renee It implies that when we are not thinking, but acting automatically by reflex and not reflection, we don't exist.
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Post by jonbain on Jul 17, 2021 9:53:36 GMT
Eugene 2.0 I see no reason to use formulae in language like this ever. I reckon the philosophy is certainly analytical. I found no obvious problems in the English grammar, but it was a bit verbose. Its always been a favorite argument of mine. That people even think it can be denied at all is typically an emotional response to the implication of God in Descartes work - a subconscious guilt reaction. Frege once said: "No appeal to intuition!". He wanted to say by this that in logic (and in math, and in many such fields) we should not to appeal to some psychology, because it would be just tricks. The most important thing is that - we cannot get rid of using psychology in logic either. Any inference or a conclusion - as well as a dot at the end of plain statements - is a part of psychological process of making accents. The same about dividing words into movable and immovable parts; or to see many words, instead of just one long statement (like it happens in many Indian languages as in Cherokee). Another problem that having as psychology so no-intuition cannot help us in problematizing logic, because either to prove logic, or to disprove it - we cannot get rid of using logic. It's the same as to try to disprove any language by using language, or - in a lesser strictly sense - to disprove one science using the same science. Seems like logic is something very intimate to us along with our own psychic processes. Anyway, even if the Cartesian formula isn't deniable, it must be proved by each one person, - and this chance allows us to suppose of having certain subjective semantics. As Joustos rightly said above that St. Augustine was using almost the same formulation before Descartes, this might also lead us to conclude that the main idea of the Cartesian argument isn't in its logical structure, but it hides. It's something very intimate. Not without reason both thinkers (St. Augustine and Descartes) was writing about their experience about this idea as something very intimate to them, something very close to their meditations - and they felt it during not only their processes or thinking, but during their processes of meditations also. The role of intuition and psychology here is delicate. Too many make the mistake of using such things as final conclusions, or assume that they are acts of logic. My use of psychology here is really an observation of the mind of the person. Its empirical. Philosophers that reject observations are in a state of solipsism. Intuition, however is the precursor to both logic and observation. We can describe intuition in the hope of reaching the mind of the other, but its never conclusive in itself.
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Post by Eugene 2.0 on Jul 18, 2021 3:27:18 GMT
Frege once said: "No appeal to intuition!". He wanted to say by this that in logic (and in math, and in many such fields) we should not to appeal to some psychology, because it would be just tricks. The most important thing is that - we cannot get rid of using psychology in logic either. Any inference or a conclusion - as well as a dot at the end of plain statements - is a part of psychological process of making accents. The same about dividing words into movable and immovable parts; or to see many words, instead of just one long statement (like it happens in many Indian languages as in Cherokee). Another problem that having as psychology so no-intuition cannot help us in problematizing logic, because either to prove logic, or to disprove it - we cannot get rid of using logic. It's the same as to try to disprove any language by using language, or - in a lesser strictly sense - to disprove one science using the same science. Seems like logic is something very intimate to us along with our own psychic processes. Anyway, even if the Cartesian formula isn't deniable, it must be proved by each one person, - and this chance allows us to suppose of having certain subjective semantics. As Joustos rightly said above that St. Augustine was using almost the same formulation before Descartes, this might also lead us to conclude that the main idea of the Cartesian argument isn't in its logical structure, but it hides. It's something very intimate. Not without reason both thinkers (St. Augustine and Descartes) was writing about their experience about this idea as something very intimate to them, something very close to their meditations - and they felt it during not only their processes or thinking, but during their processes of meditations also. The role of intuition and psychology here is delicate. Too many make the mistake of using such things as final conclusions, or assume that they are acts of logic. My use of psychology here is really an observation of the mind of the person. Its empirical. Philosophers that reject observations are in a state of solipsism. Intuition, however is the precursor to both logic and observation. We can describe intuition in the hope of reaching the mind of the other, but its never conclusive in itself. I noticed that in my life majorly I used to intuition, than anything else. Some said that's it's not so good for your mond, but – as you rightly said – the mind does it firstly. And in what I also agree is that such a disciple has to be empirical for better results sake. Cases of petitio principii occur much often, than we can imagine. Also, I have to say that for me psychology is something for personal in that aspect that there are personal approaches to each one who addresses to it and gets response. For example, if I want to know what to inform I a person A in moment T, then how the behaviour of A will be changing during T+n, etc. Or to which type of character that person P belongs? Or if this person has a type of smth. – S, then what reaction R should I expect from him doing some action A? And so one.
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Post by MAYA-EL on Jul 19, 2021 15:15:24 GMT
Frege once said: "No appeal to intuition!". He wanted to say by this that in logic (and in math, and in many such fields) we should not to appeal to some psychology, because it would be just tricks. The most important thing is that - we cannot get rid of using psychology in logic either. Any inference or a conclusion - as well as a dot at the end of plain statements - is a part of psychological process of making accents. The same about dividing words into movable and immovable parts; or to see many words, instead of just one long statement (like it happens in many Indian languages as in Cherokee). Another problem that having as psychology so no-intuition cannot help us in problematizing logic, because either to prove logic, or to disprove it - we cannot get rid of using logic. It's the same as to try to disprove any language by using language, or - in a lesser strictly sense - to disprove one science using the same science. Seems like logic is something very intimate to us along with our own psychic processes. Anyway, even if the Cartesian formula isn't deniable, it must be proved by each one person, - and this chance allows us to suppose of having certain subjective semantics. As Joustos rightly said above that St. Augustine was using almost the same formulation before Descartes, this might also lead us to conclude that the main idea of the Cartesian argument isn't in its logical structure, but it hides. It's something very intimate. Not without reason both thinkers (St. Augustine and Descartes) was writing about their experience about this idea as something very intimate to them, something very close to their meditations - and they felt it during not only their processes or thinking, but during their processes of meditations also. The role of intuition and psychology here is delicate. Too many make the mistake of using such things as final conclusions, or assume that they are acts of logic. My use of psychology here is really an observation of the mind of the person. Its empirical. Philosophers that reject observations are in a state of solipsism. Intuition, however is the precursor to both logic and observation. We can describe intuition in the hope of reaching the mind of the other, but its never conclusive in itself. Isn't it just all semantics? As we try to chop up the human psyche into cold categories that can generically be tossed around like a football that everybody knows how to catch when that's not an organic situation but it involves organic beings. For instance can you show me what an intuition looks like? And is it identical to an intuition that I could find in say, guatemala? How tall is an intuition?. what color is it?. The reality is that there is no body or shape of intuition it's semantically placed like a dunce cap on to whoever wants or needs it And usually due to some agenda or cognitive dissidents they will mold it into whatever shape it needs to be in order to better them in a particular scenario which leads to the very reason why intuition is a different shape for every person.
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Post by jonbain on Jul 19, 2021 16:00:19 GMT
MAYA-ELI can give an example of intuition. Having successfully programmed a Newtonian gravity algorithm, with numerous bodies in orbits that interacted, my intuition was telling me that the math was so perfect, than any adjustment to it would make the solar system unworkable. And that if we used gravity moving at the speed of light, this would prevent proper repeating orbits from being so perfect. At the time, that was the big question in astrophysics. (2013). So I added Einstein's various formula to the solar system, and my intuition was correct, if gravity moves at light-speed, then the moon, for example, would depart the earth at a massive 400m per orbit. So Einstein MUST be wrong. No doubt at all. Then they give the Nobel prize for claiming precisely the opposite in 2017. Now my intuition is clanging the alarm bell like crazy. So I spend the next 4 years pouring over every article that is published by academia on the matter. It is now clear to me that academia is corrupt beyond imagination. My intuition is now telling me that if they cannot perform such essential math, such fairly simple algorithms; then I CANNOT trust anything they say about something as complex as life and medicine. So I trust nothing that the media, law nor academia says on the current crisis which I can only rename "coroner's virus". We are being lied to on a colossal scale. <------- (see my website for details)
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