A logic without semantics might be just a set of usual symbols, so the interpreted logic is the one which semantics has an exemplified model, i.e. the real model aka the displayed projection from the logic onto the reality.
Usually we're dealing with bivalent logics, or many-valued logic /and with fuzzy logics as well/, but it's rare to deal with one-valued except for highlighting tautological component in 'em, not that we'll discussing this one below.
#1. Tautologies. Munchhausen's Trilemma is a Hans Albert's example of how we wrong with our rationalization. Briefly it says: all we have is our axioms and the rules of derivations. All of them are just invented deities. So, what we're trying to pursue is our own ghosts.
In this sense, one-valued logics are displaying on some abstract surface or a matter through our ignorance of anything.
#2. The next one is about McTaggart's time series, namely B-series and C-series. I guess that as B so the C series can be suited well. The main idea of it is that there's no future, no past, but the sequence. However, as long as such series in time exist, then to get some X one has to do a number N of actions; and there's no other route to get that X.
In this sense, one-valued logic is projecting onto some models which has straight and linear structure, and inside such a structure any element can be found, so there's no element that cannot be found there, i.e. such logic works.
#3. The last one interpretation is that can be called as Meinong's Jungle. This notion is well-known, that principle of Meinong reads that even non-existent deities exist somehow; or such deities are withing some other ontologies. Anyway, any kind of states of affairs will be plausible in our model.
So, such one-valued logic posts an existence of any elements within some complex ontologies, Meinong's Jungle sorta.