|
Post by Elizabeth on Aug 8, 2020 5:57:23 GMT
Heard this recently from someone who likes philosophy and loved the quote. What are your thoughts of it?
To search for God with logical proof .. is like searching for the Sun with a Lamp. Sufi poverb
I think it makes all the sense in the world. Good job Sufi...whoever/whatever you are. I say this because people are searching for it the wrong way. Turn the lamp off and find the light of the sun. Turn off the way you think your logic works and find how things truly work.
|
|
|
Post by Eugene 2.0 on Aug 13, 2020 20:59:02 GMT
2) ∃xFx→Fa - is correct 1) ∀xFx→Fa - yes. About x=plate. "x" are variables, and here "x" is rather a class, than an object. (It also has to be taken into account that there are some logical problems with all that, including the problem of universals; for instance, if "x" is a color, then to be with it? Because we cannot to put together plates and colors.) So, if x=plate, then a=plate. If ∀xFx means 'all x has a color Ultra', then Fa means 'a has a color Ultra', so if a є {x1, x2, x3, ..., xn-1, xn}, then ∀xFx means 'all plates has a color Ultra, and Fa means 'the plate has a color Ultra". And this example is interesting to notice, that Fa 'this plate has a color Ultra' is exemplification of ∀xFx. As not being a primarly a logician, I don't want to make an impression I know much all about it, so what I'm telling is not the necessary what a logician may tell. But I'll try to hold a view that many of exercise-books give. (Mathematicians are logicians, and as soon as physicians use math almost constantly: they are logicians too) - I got this example for a nice and indeed honoured book of M. Cohen, E. Nagel "An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method" (1936 - the first publication). By this example (using indirect proof in syllogistics) they wanted to show that exemplification may be accepted just from nothing (I'll try to write down this example sometimes later). I guess that is a normal usage of formula, except for taking a distinction between variables and individuals (or constants). - And again, Predicate Calculus (or Predicate Logic) was taken as a manner of using Calculus. Sygmas, capital P (П), and many other came from Calculus to Predicate Logic. And plain Propositional Calculus (i.e. Propositional Logic) is also a kind of using algebraic symbols. At the beginning of XX century many logicians were mathematics, and vice versa. The development of logic was intensive. Frege and Russell, along with Hilbert, Peano, Whitehead, and some others directed their forced at the development as apparatus so first problems of mathematical logic. (About exemplification!) - An exemplification from ∃xFx to Fa seems not to be obvious, but more natural (?), because the sense of ∃xFx is a meaning that there is such x that F. - What does it mean (as I understand it)? - It means that if there is nothing left except for using ordinary, natural language, we will be able to say that ∃xFx spells as exemplification. ∀xFx, on the other hand, is quite different. From one side, it is, but there may be cases (as I said about laws, rules, claims, prescriptions... above) there it can't be strongly stick to the meaning of "there is an a that F...". So, usually, the first what many logicians are trying to do is to imply somehow many different formulas to understand the meaning of ∀xFx more clearly (to make ∀xFx be more clear, than before it). And also, there are some models in PL and some other forms of logic (Boolean type PL) where ∀xFx→Fa doesn't work. While ∃xFx→Fa works almost in every logical system (well, I don't know where it doesn't work). Thanks again for asking. I think I should repeat myself again that despite of what I know in logic, I won't recommend myself as a good explainer.
Here's another attempt.
X=Plates coloured only with Ultra
Fx=X does not contain red, blue, or yellow
∀xFx→Fa = That all plates coloured only with Ultra contain neither red, blue, or yellow, implies that there exists a plate coloured only with Ultra that contains neither red, blue, or yellow.
Is this correct usage?
Yes. Exactly. - Your example makes me wonder what are you keeping in mind =) I asked ggl about ultra, and it doesn't give me a good example of it. It loaded me with shampoos and lipsticks. I heard about Ultraviolet color - this color is really magnificent. I always like dark blue colors. They emit (emanate?) calmness, silence. Why Ultra doesn't contain blue? Isn't it blue as it background/foundation/basis?
|
|
|
Post by karl on Aug 13, 2020 21:08:51 GMT
Here's another attempt.
X=Plates coloured only with Ultra
Fx=X does not contain red, blue, or yellow
∀xFx→Fa = That all plates coloured only with Ultra contain neither red, blue, or yellow, implies that there exists a plate coloured only with Ultra that contains neither red, blue, or yellow.
Is this correct usage?
Yes. Exactly. - Your example makes me wonder what are you keeping in mind =) I asked ggl about ultra, and it doesn't give me a good example of it. It loaded me with shampoos and lipsticks. I heard about Ultraviolet color - this color is really magnificent. I always like dark blue colors. They emit (emanate?) calmness, silence. Why Ultra doesn't contain blue? Isn't it blue as it background/foundation/basis?
Ultra is the name I chose for a colour that doesn't exist, which is why it doesn't contain red, blue, or yellow. So, in fact, Fa in this case is false.
The question is how to then assess ∀xFx. For since Ultra is a colour that doesn't exists, then a plate coloured only with Ultra can't contain any colour, and hence doesn't contain red, blue, or yellow. So is ∀xFx:
1. True 2. False, since no plate can be coloured with a colour that doesn't exist.
3. Meaningless
|
|
|
Post by Eugene 2.0 on Aug 13, 2020 21:57:23 GMT
Yes. Exactly. - Your example makes me wonder what are you keeping in mind =) I asked ggl about ultra, and it doesn't give me a good example of it. It loaded me with shampoos and lipsticks. I heard about Ultraviolet color - this color is really magnificent. I always like dark blue colors. They emit (emanate?) calmness, silence. Why Ultra doesn't contain blue? Isn't it blue as it background/foundation/basis?
Ultra is the name I chose for a colour that doesn't exist, which is why it doesn't contain red, blue, or yellow. So, in fact, Fa in this case is false.
The question is how to then assess ∀xFx. For since Ultra is a colour that doesn't exists, then a plate coloured only with Ultra can't contain any colour, and hence doesn't contain red, blue, or yellow. So is ∀xFx:
1. True 2. False, since no plate can be coloured with a colour that doesn't exist.
3. Meaningless
Aha, now I see it. Then it has to be corrected as such: ∀xFx→Fa Fa→∃xFx ∴ ∀xFx→∃xFx Why this form? Because in your sentences there is "there is". I mean "there is x ..." is a claim of a quantitative form. Fa, here, is rather fact, a manifestation of what it gives. So, then if ∀xFx is true it implies Fa (noticing that ∀xFx→Fa is rather a form, a sentence, than a claim, an uttering). If ∀xFx→Fa had a view □(∀xFx→Fa), then Fa must be implied from it. As long as we need to move from ∀xFx→Fa to ∃xFx through Fa, the last one somehow must be (! - must, even there's no logical necessity squares; I mean □Fa) given as true. Fa must be true to claim ∃xFx; else won't allow us to achieve ∀xFx→∃xFx (to get this conclusion the middle term Fa has to be true at least in one of the premises). Actually this rule - that the middle term has to be true in one of the premises might be violated - we still would get the answer: 1→0 0→1 ∴ 1→1 but in this case the sense would be lost. If Fa is false, then we haven't got a falsification.
|
|
|
Post by karl on Aug 14, 2020 8:32:30 GMT
Ultra is the name I chose for a colour that doesn't exist, which is why it doesn't contain red, blue, or yellow. So, in fact, Fa in this case is false.
The question is how to then assess ∀xFx. For since Ultra is a colour that doesn't exists, then a plate coloured only with Ultra can't contain any colour, and hence doesn't contain red, blue, or yellow. So is ∀xFx:
1. True 2. False, since no plate can be coloured with a colour that doesn't exist.
3. Meaningless
Aha, now I see it. Then it has to be corrected as such: ∀xFx→Fa Fa→∃xFx ∴ ∀xFx→∃xFx Why this form? Because in your sentences there is "there is". I mean "there is x ..." is a claim of a quantitative form. Fa, here, is rather fact, a manifestation of what it gives. So, then if ∀xFx is true it implies Fa (noticing that ∀xFx→Fa is rather a form, a sentence, than a claim, an uttering). If ∀xFx→Fa had a view □(∀xFx→Fa), then Fa must be implied from it. As long as we need to move from ∀xFx→Fa to ∃xFx through Fa, the last one somehow must be (! - must, even there's no logical necessity squares; I mean □Fa) given as true. Fa must be true to claim ∃xFx; else won't allow us to achieve ∀xFx→∃xFx (to get this conclusion the middle term Fa has to be true at least in one of the premises). Actually this rule - that the middle term has to be true in one of the premises might be violated - we still would get the answer: 1→0 0→1 ∴ 1→1 but in this case the sense would be lost. If Fa is false, then we haven't got a falsification.
Yes, I should not have used the word "exist".
∀xFx→Fa = That all plates coloured only with Ultra contain neither red, blue, or yellow, implies that if there exists a plate coloured only with Ultra, it will contain neither red, blue, or yellow.
Do you agree with this?
|
|
|
Post by Eugene 2.0 on Aug 14, 2020 18:01:31 GMT
Aha, now I see it. Then it has to be corrected as such: ∀xFx→Fa Fa→∃xFx ∴ ∀xFx→∃xFx Why this form? Because in your sentences there is "there is". I mean "there is x ..." is a claim of a quantitative form. Fa, here, is rather fact, a manifestation of what it gives. So, then if ∀xFx is true it implies Fa (noticing that ∀xFx→Fa is rather a form, a sentence, than a claim, an uttering). If ∀xFx→Fa had a view □(∀xFx→Fa), then Fa must be implied from it. As long as we need to move from ∀xFx→Fa to ∃xFx through Fa, the last one somehow must be (! - must, even there's no logical necessity squares; I mean □Fa) given as true. Fa must be true to claim ∃xFx; else won't allow us to achieve ∀xFx→∃xFx (to get this conclusion the middle term Fa has to be true at least in one of the premises). Actually this rule - that the middle term has to be true in one of the premises might be violated - we still would get the answer: 1→0 0→1 ∴ 1→1 but in this case the sense would be lost. If Fa is false, then we haven't got a falsification.
Yes, I should not have used the word "exist".
∀xFx→Fa = That all plates coloured only with Ultra contain neither red, blue, or yellow, implies that if there exists a plate coloured only with Ultra, it will contain neither red, blue, or yellow.
Do you agree with this?
I like the example, it shines :) Well, if to formalize according to the rules, then it's not exactly. ∀xFx→Fa can be written as "If for each x it's fair that x has (a property) F, then a is F" (where a is either a proper name, or a definite description, and F is an (real) attribute of a). Such a note is a way to guess that may be some kind of a theory of Fa (a fact, or a word construction that supposes to referr to something that is true). "All plates coloured only with Ultra don't contain red, blue, or yellow colors, implies that if there exists a plate coloured only with Ultra, it won't contain red, blue, or yellow" must be written as: ∀x(Px→Fx)→Px&Fx I understand where I failed there. We took "plates" so we had to note it adding this definition as Px. Because in logic there's no difference between "plates" and "colors". However, the previous notation is also possible, but we should write down Fp instead of Fx. Fx is x has Ultra color. "Plates" is prohibited in such a way to be added.
|
|
|
Post by karl on Aug 14, 2020 18:40:48 GMT
Yes, I should not have used the word "exist".
∀xFx→Fa = That all plates coloured only with Ultra contain neither red, blue, or yellow, implies that if there exists a plate coloured only with Ultra, it will contain neither red, blue, or yellow.
Do you agree with this?
I like the example, it shines Well, if to formalize according to the rules, then it's not exactly. ∀xFx→Fa can be written as "If for each x it's fair that x has (a property) F, then a is F" (where a is either a proper name, or a definite description, and F is an (real) attribute of a). Such a note is a way to guess that may be some kind of a theory of Fa (a fact, or a word construction that supposes to referr to something that is true). "All plates coloured only with Ultra don't contain red, blue, or yellow colors, implies that if there exists a plate coloured only with Ultra, it won't contain red, blue, or yellow" must be written as: ∀x(Px→Fx)→Px&Fx I understand where I failed there. We took "plates" so we had to note it adding this definition as Px. Because in logic there's no difference between "plates" and "colors". However, the previous notation is also possible, but we should write down Fp instead of Fx. Fx is x has Ultra color. "Plates" is prohibited in such a way to be added.
Does "it's fair that x has (a property) F" mean "may have property F"?
So ∀xFx→Fa means: "If for every x, x may have property Ultra, then a is Ultra"
Is this correct?
|
|
|
Post by Eugene 2.0 on Aug 14, 2020 18:48:34 GMT
I like the example, it shines Well, if to formalize according to the rules, then it's not exactly. ∀xFx→Fa can be written as "If for each x it's fair that x has (a property) F, then a is F" (where a is either a proper name, or a definite description, and F is an (real) attribute of a). Such a note is a way to guess that may be some kind of a theory of Fa (a fact, or a word construction that supposes to referr to something that is true). "All plates coloured only with Ultra don't contain red, blue, or yellow colors, implies that if there exists a plate coloured only with Ultra, it won't contain red, blue, or yellow" must be written as: ∀x(Px→Fx)→Px&Fx I understand where I failed there. We took "plates" so we had to note it adding this definition as Px. Because in logic there's no difference between "plates" and "colors". However, the previous notation is also possible, but we should write down Fp instead of Fx. Fx is x has Ultra color. "Plates" is prohibited in such a way to be added. Does "it's fair that x has (a property) F" mean "may have property F"?
So ∀xFx→Fa means: "If for every x, x may have property Ultra, then a is Ultra" Is this correct?
Oh, no. I added spare words again. (Language... I can't get used to it.) No, there's no probability. No "mays". Just: If all x has F, then a has F. P.S. What would you advise for me to start learn basics of Norwegian language? I kniw some YT videos, but I don't know. They are explicit and bright, but I think I should start learning it by reading or smth like that. Thanks.
|
|
|
Post by karl on Aug 14, 2020 18:53:56 GMT
Does "it's fair that x has (a property) F" mean "may have property F"?
So ∀xFx→Fa means: "If for every x, x may have property Ultra, then a is Ultra" Is this correct?
Oh, no. I added spare words again. (Language... I can't get used to it.) No, there's no probability. No "mays". Just: If all x has F, then a has F. P.S. What would you advise for me to start learn basics of Norwegian language? I kniw some YT videos, but I don't know. They are explicit and bright, but I think I should start learning it by reading or smth like that. Thanks.
Ok. Previously you wrote that Fa meant "a is F", now you write that it means "a has F (as property)". Those two do not mean the same. Which one is correct?
I'll think about the question you asked about Norwegian before I respond to it.
|
|
|
Post by Eugene 2.0 on Aug 15, 2020 3:30:54 GMT
Oh, no. I added spare words again. (Language... I can't get used to it.) No, there's no probability. No "mays". Just: If all x has F, then a has F. P.S. What would you advise for me to start learn basics of Norwegian language? I kniw some YT videos, but I don't know. They are explicit and bright, but I think I should start learning it by reading or smth like that. Thanks.
Ok. Previously you wrote that Fa meant "a is F", now you write that it means "a has F (as property)". Those two do not mean the same. Which one is correct?
I'll think about the question you asked about Norwegian before I respond to it.
Ok, for certain. Well, as for me there is no much difference between"is" and "have". I know there is a difference, and we might confuse it. To say what exactly connection in logical sentences is not so easy, leastways for me. Usually it "is"; nevertheless there, in logical statements, is "is" its meaning primary is technical: we attribute "F" to x. Otherwise, Fx can be picked from the numbers of propositional forms (Fx, in contradistinction to Fa is propositional form, not a proposition). Thus "F" is using as a tag, the same as "y" in {x} and {x,y} : "y" here what is what not "x", it has different properties or structure (for Sets is irrelevant, however the structure can substitute the sign's individuality).
|
|
|
Post by karl on Aug 15, 2020 5:22:52 GMT
Ok. Previously you wrote that Fa meant "a is F", now you write that it means "a has F (as property)". Those two do not mean the same. Which one is correct?
I'll think about the question you asked about Norwegian before I respond to it.
Ok, for certain. Well, as for me there is no much difference between"is" and "have". I know there is a difference, and we might confuse it. To say what exactly connection in logical sentences is not so easy, leastways for me. Usually it "is"; nevertheless there, in logical statements, is "is" its meaning primary is technical: we attribute "F" to x. Otherwise, Fx can be picked from the numbers of propositional forms (Fx, in contradistinction to Fa is propositional form, not a proposition). Thus "F" is using as a tag, the same as "y" in {x} and {x,y} : "y" here what is what not "x", it has different properties or structure (for Sets is irrelevant, however the structure can substitute the sign's individuality).
I just looked up predicate logic here:
This example explained it well:
"For instance, {x | x is a positive integer less than 4} is the set {1,2,3}.
If t is an element of the set {x | P(x)}, then the statement P(t) is true."
I doubt the usefulness of learning Norwegian. -Other than that it would allow you to read some Norwegian classics in their original language, such as Ibsen's work.
|
|
|
Post by Eugene 2.0 on Aug 15, 2020 10:13:32 GMT
karl(Huh, it's strange. This notation didn't appear in my notification bar...). Using Set Theory language must be correct, because all the modern logicians consider it. So yes, it seems correct. Well I don't wanna refuse to know Norwegian language a little. There were times people didn't stick too much around English and life were not so globally problemed. I take a view differences, variety, diversification, divergence, and plurality is always coller, than any other monistic monotone same-repeatnesses. Sure, all should be sufficiently. As we've taken Set Theory interpretation we need know what about Gödel's view of it may say. What then is exemplification as soon as there are just free deities in a set, and what is positivity? Godöl, I guess, needed to appeal to (potentially) endless number of positive attributes if and only if he reffered such a number to God. Btw, do you speak Swedish?
|
|
|
Post by karl on Aug 15, 2020 11:28:48 GMT
karl (Huh, it's strange. This notation didn't appear in my notification bar...). Using Set Theory language must be correct, because all the modern logicians consider it. So yes, it seems correct. Well I don't wanna refuse to know Norwegian language a little. There were times people didn't stick too much around English and life were not so globally problemed. I take a view differences, variety, diversification, divergence, and plurality is always coller, than any other monistic monotone same-repeatnesses. Sure, all should be sufficiently. As we've taken Set Theory interpretation we need know what about Gödel's view of it may say. What then is exemplification as soon as there are just free deities in a set, and what is positivity? Godöl, I guess, needed to appeal to (potentially) endless number of positive attributes if and only if he reffered such a number to God. Btw, do you speak Swedish?
Gödel's proof depends in reality on that we do not try to define positive properties. For if we do, and a positive property is "being conscious", then it would soon be clear that Gödel's method will not allow us to prove the existence of a conscious God.
When you write: "just free deities in a set", do you mean to state that Gödel's proof opens up for more than one God? Because, yes, it does. What's missing from Gödel's proof is an axiom that makes it clear that there exists only one God. And there couldn't be one without messing up the proof itself. One can imagine two gods with identical properties, meaning, having all positive properties, and yet be two separate beings. The reason for this is that being a separate being doesn't depend on having different properties. Rather, the separation lies in that they have each their consciousness and each their free will.
You meant only learn a little bit Norwegian? I thought you considered studying to the point of mastering it. -Which would, as with any language, be tons of work. Here are some Norwegian sentences:
My name is Eugene
Mitt navn er Eugene
I am from Ukraine
Jeg er fra Ukraina
We live in a chaotic time
Vi lever i en kaotisk tid
There is no point in asking the question: What are people thinking? For that premises that people think, and they don't.
Det er ingen vits i a spørre: What tenker folk på? For det forutsetter at folk tenker, noe de ikke gjør
I can understand Swedish, but I can't really speak it.
|
|
|
Post by Eugene 2.0 on Aug 15, 2020 12:50:55 GMT
karl (Huh, it's strange. This notation didn't appear in my notification bar...). Using Set Theory language must be correct, because all the modern logicians consider it. So yes, it seems correct. Well I don't wanna refuse to know Norwegian language a little. There were times people didn't stick too much around English and life were not so globally problemed. I take a view differences, variety, diversification, divergence, and plurality is always coller, than any other monistic monotone same-repeatnesses. Sure, all should be sufficiently. As we've taken Set Theory interpretation we need know what about Gödel's view of it may say. What then is exemplification as soon as there are just free deities in a set, and what is positivity? Godöl, I guess, needed to appeal to (potentially) endless number of positive attributes if and only if he reffered such a number to God. Btw, do you speak Swedish?
Gödel's proof depends in reality on that we do not try to define positive properties. For if we do, and a positive property is "being conscious", then it would soon be clear that Gödel's method will not allow us to prove the existence of a conscious God.
When you write: "just free deities in a set", do you mean to state that Gödel's proof opens up for more than one God? Because, yes, it does. What's missing from Gödel's proof is an axiom that makes it clear that there exists only one God. And there couldn't be one without messing up the proof itself. One can imagine two gods with identical properties, meaning, having all positive properties, and yet be two separate beings. The reason for this is that being a separate being doesn't depend on having different properties. Rather, the separation lies in that they have each their consciousness and each their free will.
You meant only learn a little bit Norwegian? I thought you considered studying to the point of mastering it. -Which would, as with any language, be tons of work. Here are some Norwegian sentences:
My name is Eugene
Mitt navn er Eugene
I am from Ukraine
Jeg er fra Ukraina
We live in a chaotic time
Vi lever i en kaotisk tid
There is no point in asking the question: What are people thinking? For that premises that people think, and they don't.
Det er ingen vits i a spørre: What tenker folk på? For det forutsetter at folk tenker, noe de ikke gjør
I can understand Swedish, but I can't really speak it.
Very nice! :) I know there is lotta work to know something even at the plain level. Anyway I'll try a little. (I guess it's because of not having extra time.) Folk er det de tenker for de gjør er lever i a kaotisk tid. (Folk is that they think what they do - is living in a chaotic time.) Jeg har a spørre: hva en forutsett jeg skrev? (I have a question: what a premise I wrote?) Unnskyld meg for feiler. Jeg beklager lagte mange feiler. Execuse me for mistakes. I apologize if I made mistakes. About Gödel's proof: this was what I thought - plural possible gods. Because what he did not do was neither narrow picking, nor differentiation one from another. As far as I know technically this question was raised (in the different form) by Saul Kripke in "Naming and Necessity" (~70's?). He speculated about a posteriori necessary statements which we needed to have as long as, for example, we were still thinking that Richard Nixon is Richard Nixon in every possible world. We would not think that Nixon would hold democratic views, or else what defined him from not being him? Our experience might be taken as a tool to differ it, or in the other case, there would be no chances to make things clearer. (I must say I don't remember much about the article). What I continue to guess is what the logical structure of the proof, and how technically it looks. On the one hand it seems irrelevant and spare, on the other - his logical path is his practical-reflection on this question; it's his view as... an artist (?) about the question.
|
|
|
Post by karl on Aug 15, 2020 13:53:26 GMT
Gödel's proof depends in reality on that we do not try to define positive properties. For if we do, and a positive property is "being conscious", then it would soon be clear that Gödel's method will not allow us to prove the existence of a conscious God.
When you write: "just free deities in a set", do you mean to state that Gödel's proof opens up for more than one God? Because, yes, it does. What's missing from Gödel's proof is an axiom that makes it clear that there exists only one God. And there couldn't be one without messing up the proof itself. One can imagine two gods with identical properties, meaning, having all positive properties, and yet be two separate beings. The reason for this is that being a separate being doesn't depend on having different properties. Rather, the separation lies in that they have each their consciousness and each their free will.
You meant only learn a little bit Norwegian? I thought you considered studying to the point of mastering it. -Which would, as with any language, be tons of work. Here are some Norwegian sentences:
My name is Eugene
Mitt navn er Eugene
I am from Ukraine
Jeg er fra Ukraina
We live in a chaotic time
Vi lever i en kaotisk tid
There is no point in asking the question: What are people thinking? For that premises that people think, and they don't.
Det er ingen vits i a spørre: What tenker folk på? For det forutsetter at folk tenker, noe de ikke gjør
I can understand Swedish, but I can't really speak it.
Very nice! I know there is lotta work to know something even at the plain level. Anyway I'll try a little. (I guess it's because of not having extra time.) Folk er det de tenker for de gjør er lever i a kaotisk tid. (Folk is that they think what they do - is living in a chaotic time.) Jeg har a spørre: hva en forutsett jeg skrev? (I have a question: what a premise I wrote?) Unnskyld meg for feiler. Jeg beklager lagte mange feiler. Execuse me for mistakes. I apologize if I made mistakes. About Gödel's proof: this was what I thought - plural possible gods. Because what he did not do was neither narrow picking, nor differentiation one from another. As far as I know technically this question was raised (in the different form) by Saul Kripke in "Naming and Necessity" (~70's?). He speculated about a posteriori necessary statements which we needed to have as long as, for example, we were still thinking that Richard Nixon is Richard Nixon in every possible world. We would not think that Nixon would hold democratic views, or else what defined him from not being him? Our experience might be taken as a tool to differ it, or in the other case, there would be no chances to make things clearer. (I must say I don't remember much about the article). What I continue to guess is what the logical structure of the proof, and how technically it looks. On the one hand it seems irrelevant and spare, on the other - his logical path is his practical-reflection on this question; it's his view as... an artist (?) about the question.
What I wrote about people not thinking, was not referring to you and what you wrote. It was just a general statement about people overall. I see the real struggle in society as being between the mindless majority and the conscious minority.
As for your Norwegian sentences:
(Folk is that they think what they do - is living in a chaotic time.
Folk er det de tenker for de gjør er lever i a kaotisk tid.)
Eh... I didn't understand that. Folk=people. So you wrote: "People are what they think they do. -Living in a chaotic time." I can't make sense of that.
(I have a question: what a premise I wrote?
Jeg har a spørre: hva en forutsett jeg skrev?)
My preferred translation would be: Jeg har et spørsmål. Hva mener du jeg forutsatte i hva jeg skrev?"
(=What do you believe I premised in what I wrote?)
(Execuse me for mistakes. I apologize if I made mistakes.
Unnskyld meg for feiler. Jeg beklager lagte mange feiler.)
My translation: Jeg beklager hvis jeg har gjort feil.
Or, rather, since I presume it refers to having written something wrong, and since you used the word "mange"=a lot, it would be: Jeg beklager hvis jeg har skrevet mye feil. (=I am sorry if have written a lot that is incorrect.)
(Skrevet=written)
What Gödel's proof illustrates is that logic is useless unless one always have a clear idea about what exactly is the meaning of the concepts we analyse logically, when we try to understand their relation to one another. If there is no clarity in what the concepts mean, such as for example, what is a positive property and why does being godlike have to include all positive properties, then the logical reasoning that follows is of limited value.
What Kurt Gödel actually thought about God isn't revealed in his proof of God's existence.
Richard Nixon would ultimately be the soul which his brain allowed to be conscious and could exercise free will. Nixon wasn't his choices, but the soul that made those choices. Had he been reborn in a world identical to the one he was born in on Earth, he would be likely to manifest himself in that world with traits similar to how he manifested in this world, and had he been reborn in a different environment , his choices could have been dramatically different, and he might have become a defender of democracy. A clone of Richard Nixon wouldn't be Richard Nixon. Who you are is your soul, not your physical being. Your brain is the landscape your soul maneuvers in, and which set the limitations for what choices you can make. But the brain itself is not your soul.
|
|
|
Post by Eugene 2.0 on Aug 15, 2020 15:39:29 GMT
Very nice! I know there is lotta work to know something even at the plain level. Anyway I'll try a little. (I guess it's because of not having extra time.) Folk er det de tenker for de gjør er lever i a kaotisk tid. (Folk is that they think what they do - is living in a chaotic time.) Jeg har a spørre: hva en forutsett jeg skrev? (I have a question: what a premise I wrote?) Unnskyld meg for feiler. Jeg beklager lagte mange feiler. Execuse me for mistakes. I apologize if I made mistakes. About Gödel's proof: this was what I thought - plural possible gods. Because what he did not do was neither narrow picking, nor differentiation one from another. As far as I know technically this question was raised (in the different form) by Saul Kripke in "Naming and Necessity" (~70's?). He speculated about a posteriori necessary statements which we needed to have as long as, for example, we were still thinking that Richard Nixon is Richard Nixon in every possible world. We would not think that Nixon would hold democratic views, or else what defined him from not being him? Our experience might be taken as a tool to differ it, or in the other case, there would be no chances to make things clearer. (I must say I don't remember much about the article). What I continue to guess is what the logical structure of the proof, and how technically it looks. On the one hand it seems irrelevant and spare, on the other - his logical path is his practical-reflection on this question; it's his view as... an artist (?) about the question.
What I wrote about people not thinking, was not referring to you and what you wrote. It was just a general statement about people overall. I see the real struggle in society as being between the mindless majority and the conscious minority.
As for your Norwegian sentences:
(Folk is that they think what they do - is living in a chaotic time.
Folk er det de tenker for de gjør er lever i a kaotisk tid.)
Eh... I didn't understand that. Folk=people. So you wrote: "People are what they think they do. -Living in a chaotic time." I can't make sense of that.
(I have a question: what a premise I wrote?
Jeg har a spørre: hva en forutsett jeg skrev?)
My preferred translation would be: Jeg har et spørsmål. Hva mener du jeg forutsatte i hva jeg skrev?"
(=What do you believe I premised in what I wrote?)
(Execuse me for mistakes. I apologize if I made mistakes.
Unnskyld meg for feiler. Jeg beklager lagte mange feiler.)
My translation: Jeg beklager hvis jeg har gjort feil.
Or, rather, since I presume it refers to having written something wrong, and since you used the word "mange"=a lot, it would be: Jeg beklager hvis jeg har skrevet mye feil. (=I am sorry if have written a lot that is incorrect.)
(Skrevet=written)
What Gödel's proof illustrates is that logic is useless unless one always have a clear idea about what exactly is the meaning of the concepts we analyse logically, when we try to understand their relation to one another. If there is no clarity in what the concepts mean, such as for example, what is a positive property and why does being godlike have to include all positive properties, then the logical reasoning that follows is of limited value.
What Kurt Gödel actually thought about God isn't revealed in his proof of God's existence.
Richard Nixon would ultimately be the soul which his brain allowed to be conscious and could exercise free will. Nixon wasn't his choices, but the soul that made those choices. Had he been reborn in a world identical to the one he was born in on Earth, he would be likely to manifest himself in that world with traits similar to how he manifested in this world, and had he been reborn in a different environment , his choices could have been dramatically different, and he might have become a defender of democracy. A clone of Richard Nixon wouldn't be Richard Nixon. Who you are is your soul, not your physical being. Your brain is the landscape your soul maneuvers in, and which set the limitations for what choices you can make. But the brain itself is not your soul.
... You know it's not easy to understand even basics of language with not a native language (learning Norwegian with English). Yes, I do agree, the phrases I tried to construct were poorly constructed in English (I was still thinking Ukrainian trying to do i). I found not a bad site LearningNorwegian101. Also, I found a site that was made just by one person in Russian, and thus site is huuuge. I mean it seems the one did lotta work. However there were critics (certainly, Norwegians) who pointed the developer for his mistakes. He did them. Anyway, it's not only useful and interesting to learn a language, but - I think in my poor examples it can be seen - that we require to know the underlying, core logic behind the language or its parts to use it effectively, or just to be able to use it. In English we put -s at the end, while, as I understood, in Norwegian we put -(e)r, -e, and, in definite, -ene. Depending on the end of the word, and also there are another cases when a vowel omits. I think such underlying laws might be not only helpful to be more creative, but for better understanding each other. As someone once said "Tell me something and I will see you", so artists, poets, writers and the other creators are almost always trying to represent their core hesitations, feelings, even thougts, and language helps them with it. If one hasn't been heard he'd better to take care about to improve his expressive manners. And a reciever should care about it to - trying to have heard the one. To Gödel: we need to have right meaning, and yet it might happen that a person A and a person B are talking with each other rendering to different things. I mean either they understand each other just because they somehow feel each other (intuitive talk: when A person expects ehat B will say, and one will do it), or the language they use allow variety of meanings such as: we can address from P to Q1, Q2, ..., Qn, and from a set Q to R. In such a situation A could utter "P" rendering to "Qi", while B understands one as if A through "P" refers to "Qj". Surprisingly, they both have succeeded in/at "R". By this I was going to show that in some cases equally of meaning is not necessary. To logically understanding: yes, it seems even effective, than just a plain formalization. It reminds Wittgenstein's phrase: “For a large class of cases of the employment of the word ‘meaning’—though not for all—this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (Philosophical Investigations p. 43). Nixon: Ok, a doppelganger of Nixon could be Nixon-democrate, but if there were no Nixon-republican we would never know what was like for Nixon to not be Nixon. Having got Nixon-r(epublican) we have learned (understood?) what the "other" one might be. If we never had the one there would be ni chances to claim anything about that "potential" Nixon. - You've said previously that if we never seen a thing (we have never known anything about of its possibility of being known; before we knew the one for us it was the same as the things that never existed), we can never exemplify it, right? So, here's the same. That was what Kripke had been trying to tell (and again, I can't appeal to his theory much as long as I don't remember it for sure). Again to Gödel: formalizing what he said makes our investigation on his proof quite clearer, and if before the research there were N undefined terms, and after some... let us call it "some actions" or "some work"... actions we got N-K (K<N), then some luck smiled at us.
|
|