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Post by Eugene 2.0 on Jan 19, 2020 7:31:05 GMT
How to destroy philosophy you may ask? Many tried, but it wasn't easy as long as liars participated debates (in which they were supposed to be sent to death). Each time the science had been shrugging its shoulders and arose as a titan some liars did not well things inventing stupid accusations; people believed those liars and the scientists were needed to be quiet to survive.
But the question of burying philosophy has been arising once again and not only once. This question is important, because of - whether philosophy is playing role of an arbiter in science or what? If this is so (or maybe any other arguments), then we shouldn't kill philosophy as long as it serves us as a tool of sharping our reasons.
Then, philosophy is a servant to science?
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Post by karl on Jan 19, 2020 10:05:29 GMT
The most effective way to kill philosophy is to turn it against itself. For example when postmodernists argue through pseudo-philosophical reasoning that truth is relative. Another way is to simplify the philosophical questions to such a degree that it seems like there are non left to answer. In the 90's, there were people among the academic philosophers who claimed that philosophy had solved all the main problems, and only the details remained. I wasn't aware of that philosophy had solved a single existential problem, but academia wasn't interested in existential problems. We also live in a time where an existential crisis, which every great writer and artist will have gone through in his/her life, leading to introspection as the very foundation for creativity, is regarded as nothing but a mental sickness and a chemical imbalance in the brain.
The real enemy of philosophy is superficiality and complancency. Whether one declares that truth is relative, or that there are no philosophical questions left to answer, or that existential questions are real but unanswerable with any level of clarity, leading to mysticism; What it ultimately boils down to is the individual's unwillingness to accept that the quest for truth is meaningful, yet eternal. This is also the basis for all religions' idea of afterlife, as some state of eternal bliss. In this life, mental stagnation leads to an inner sense of void, which they hope this will not be the case in the afterlife. This longing for a state of passive, eternal bliss is, as I see it, a subconscious death wish.
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Post by Eugene 2.0 on Jan 19, 2020 10:40:36 GMT
Agree. Postmodernists are those who really tried to do it. It's can be seen in Rorti's "Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature" where he arguing with problematic you've said. My point is here that philosophy is still needed to sharp its technique, so this is why details are still important, but not for all the cases, just for misconceptions, quarrels, and so on. When I started visiting philosophy courses at the local university I wanted to get into all that problems that was arisen by Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Augustine, Nietzsche and others. Lately I found that almost every discussions leaded to nothing, but quarrels or had no real ending, no real conclusions. Maybe this wasn't so bad, but it wasn't pleasure to discover yourself in an non-gravitating position when you didn't know where's the start and where's the end point... all seemed absolutely relative, and you can speak whichever you like except for increasing tough-style in your speech.
That was really bothering me, because I cannot do like that. It wasn't fair and honest. I'd rather to admire that all the philosopher were completely mad, than to continue classes further. Those questions had been pissing me off down till I started classes of logic. Before it I never know about propositional logic. I studied higher math, physics, chemistry, but never heard of logic that this existed. Propositional logic inverted my imagination to that it would be great to start arguing more clear and correct in debates. Then I got acquainted with all those Wittgenstein's, Russell's and other works. I still think that a language in debates is important to be clear. Many objections come from those who can be taken as postmodern-style thinking philosophy (except for Habermas, K.-O. Apel, and some other), and those objections are directed to language usage.
And also agree on what you call complacency and superficiality. I'd even say that this important because an example of Wittgenstein (taking Russell's interpretation as a resource) when his teachings were taken as mysticism and he wouldn't be so far of taking those accusations off.
Also, an existential problem. You know many of my colleges are bearing this view in their minds; and this talk about existence is almost in the air each time I'm speaking with them.. But this problem is really hard. I don't even know if philosophy can handled it.
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Post by xxxxxxxxx on Jan 19, 2020 15:59:44 GMT
How to destroy philosophy you may ask? Many tried, but it wasn't easy as long as liars participated debates (in which they were supposed to be sent to death). Each time the science had been shrugging its shoulders and arose as a titan some liars did not well things inventing stupid accusations; people believed those liars and the scientists were needed to be quiet to survive. But the question of burying philosophy has been arising once again and not only once. This question is important, because of - whether philosophy is playing role of an arbiter in science or what? If this is so (or maybe any other arguments), then we shouldn't kill philosophy as long as it serves us as a tool of sharping our reasons. Then, philosophy is a servant to science? Philosophy is a natural function of man's rational properties. To kill philosophy would be to restart it in a new form. Due to sciencess emphasis on relativity, do not expect philosophy, in attempting to mimic science, to become non-relativisitc. Add in the fact that eastern philosophy is grounded in relativism, do not depend on relativism leaving either. Philosophy can be reinterpreted, but that is about it. Does it need reinterpreted? Yes.
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Post by karl on Jan 19, 2020 16:42:01 GMT
Agree. Postmodernists are those who really tried to do it. It's can be seen in Rorti's "Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature" where he arguing with problematic you've said. My point is here that philosophy is still needed to sharp its technique, so this is why details are still important, but not for all the cases, just for misconceptions, quarrels, and so on. When I started visiting philosophy courses at the local university I wanted to get into all that problems that was arisen by Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Augustine, Nietzsche and others. Lately I found that almost every discussions leaded to nothing, but quarrels or had no real ending, no real conclusions. Maybe this wasn't so bad, but it wasn't pleasure to discover yourself in an non-gravitating position when you didn't know where's the start and where's the end point... all seemed absolutely relative, and you can speak whichever you like except for increasing tough-style in your speech. That was really bothering me, because I cannot do like that. It wasn't fair and honest. I'd rather to admire that all the philosopher were completely mad, than to continue classes further. Those questions had been pissing me off down till I started classes of logic. Before it I never know about propositional logic. I studied higher math, physics, chemistry, but never heard of logic that this existed. Propositional logic inverted my imagination to that it would be great to start arguing more clear and correct in debates. Then I got acquainted with all those Wittgenstein's, Russell's and other works. I still think that a language in debates is important to be clear. Many objections come from those who can be taken as postmodern-style thinking philosophy (except for Habermas, K.-O. Apel, and some other), and those objections are directed to language usage. And also agree on what you call complacency and superficiality. I'd even say that this important because an example of Wittgenstein (taking Russell's interpretation as a resource) when his teachings were taken as mysticism and he wouldn't be so far of taking those accusations off. Also, an existential problem. You know many of my colleges are bearing this view in their minds; and this talk about existence is almost in the air each time I'm speaking with them.. But this problem is really hard. I don't even know if philosophy can handled it.
I agree with Russell's claim when he stated that Wittgenstein prefers mysticism, for it allows him not to think. Wittgenstein's contempt for truth was well exemplified in his statement about Kurt Gödel's incompleteness theorem, attempting to reject its importance. Gödel responded with disbelief, asking whether Wittgenstein had lost his mind. But he hadn't. He was just dishonest to the core.
The problem with language is that it's always one step behind expressing our true thoughts. Since our thought processes are helped by language, it's a continuous feedback process, where our expansion of understanding requires an ever more advanced language, which in turn makes it easier for us to take understanding a step further, again requiring new words to express the concepts we're using. My underlying view is that all languages tap into the same inner universal conceptualised world, and an advanced language allows one to express more universal concepts than a primitive one.
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Post by Eugene 2.0 on Jan 19, 2020 18:17:57 GMT
How to destroy philosophy you may ask? Many tried, but it wasn't easy as long as liars participated debates (in which they were supposed to be sent to death). Each time the science had been shrugging its shoulders and arose as a titan some liars did not well things inventing stupid accusations; people believed those liars and the scientists were needed to be quiet to survive. But the question of burying philosophy has been arising once again and not only once. This question is important, because of - whether philosophy is playing role of an arbiter in science or what? If this is so (or maybe any other arguments), then we shouldn't kill philosophy as long as it serves us as a tool of sharping our reasons. Then, philosophy is a servant to science? Philosophy is a natural function of man's rational properties. To kill philosophy would be to restart it in a new form. Due to sciencess emphasis on relativity, do not expect philosophy, in attempting to mimic science, to become non-relativisitc. Add in the fact that eastern philosophy is grounded in relativism, do not depend on relativism leaving either. Philosophy can be reinterpreted, but that is about it. Does it need reinterpreted? Yes. They say a man abandoned somewhere, in the forest for example, starts walking circles. Your answer reminded me this fact. Does it mean all we do is wandering circles?.. I wouldn't refuse this theory, because synchrophasotron movement seems to be inside even in tiniest processes. However, I believe in "the Great Leap" - from our past to our future.
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Post by Eugene 2.0 on Jan 19, 2020 18:58:18 GMT
Agree. Postmodernists are those who really tried to do it. It's can be seen in Rorti's "Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature" where he arguing with problematic you've said. My point is here that philosophy is still needed to sharp its technique, so this is why details are still important, but not for all the cases, just for misconceptions, quarrels, and so on. When I started visiting philosophy courses at the local university I wanted to get into all that problems that was arisen by Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Augustine, Nietzsche and others. Lately I found that almost every discussions leaded to nothing, but quarrels or had no real ending, no real conclusions. Maybe this wasn't so bad, but it wasn't pleasure to discover yourself in an non-gravitating position when you didn't know where's the start and where's the end point... all seemed absolutely relative, and you can speak whichever you like except for increasing tough-style in your speech. That was really bothering me, because I cannot do like that. It wasn't fair and honest. I'd rather to admire that all the philosopher were completely mad, than to continue classes further. Those questions had been pissing me off down till I started classes of logic. Before it I never know about propositional logic. I studied higher math, physics, chemistry, but never heard of logic that this existed. Propositional logic inverted my imagination to that it would be great to start arguing more clear and correct in debates. Then I got acquainted with all those Wittgenstein's, Russell's and other works. I still think that a language in debates is important to be clear. Many objections come from those who can be taken as postmodern-style thinking philosophy (except for Habermas, K.-O. Apel, and some other), and those objections are directed to language usage. And also agree on what you call complacency and superficiality. I'd even say that this important because an example of Wittgenstein (taking Russell's interpretation as a resource) when his teachings were taken as mysticism and he wouldn't be so far of taking those accusations off. Also, an existential problem. You know many of my colleges are bearing this view in their minds; and this talk about existence is almost in the air each time I'm speaking with them.. But this problem is really hard. I don't even know if philosophy can handled it.
I agree with Russell's claim when he stated that Wittgenstein prefers mysticism, for it allows him not to think. Wittgenstein's contempt for truth was well exemplified in his statement about Kurt Gödel's incompleteness theorem, attempting to reject its importance. Gödel responded with disbelief, asking whether Wittgenstein had lost his mind. But he hadn't. He was just dishonest to the core.
The problem with language is that it's always one step behind expressing our true thoughts. Since our thought processes are helped by language, it's a continuous feedback process, where our expansion of understanding requires an ever more advanced language, which in turn makes it easier for us to take understanding a step further, again requiring new words to express the concepts we're using. My underlying view is that all languages tap into the same inner universal conceptualised world, and an advanced language allows one to express more universal concepts than a primitive one.
Thank you for the info about Wittgenstein - Godel little discussion. I didn't know that. But yes this explains some things. 1. I read on of Russian philosopher and linguist Vadim Rudnev who commented the translated work of Wittgenstein, and he said that Wittgenstein anticipated the Godel's theorem in his Tractatus. He held a discussion with another philosopher who objected his argument on Wittgenstein's anticipation. I don't know if there were any anticipations, but I think I agree with you and Russell at Wittgenstein's "weirdness", while being some skeptical toward his mysticism. Being not highly sure, but reading his diaries one'd rather find some strange behaviour, than mystical things. That's why it's possible to think that the mysticism and weirdness of Wittgenstein was one and the same. Besides of using codes to hide his daily diary Wittgenstein used many !-signs (attention?.. warn-sing?.. I don't know a name of this sign in English), while he never used superstitions or numerologies and so on. He claimed about himself as a monk among crowds; his comrades (unfortunately I don't know correct and not communistic term for this word that's why I used this one here) said that Wittgenstein did act strangely. Also, that is notable, surround situation didn't touch him, he never reacted on it like he was living inside of his own world. Moreover, the things he wrote was not easy to understand (taking as example his "Tractatus"), so he was the only one who could decode it. Beating children (if this info was really true) must discover his person better to characterize him as a strange, a weird person, rather then mystical. And what is absolutely remarkable (in his "Diaries 1914-1916" I read the story which was added just as an article, about dialogue between Moore and Russell on Wittgenstein examination right after the author of Tractatus was passed the exam... Russell and Moore were both completely discouraged to hell glancing at the work of Wittgenstein. So do many people. I spoke with some and they were complaining about this much. I used many commentary works, but I highly doubt I got something from this work much. Karnap's for example or Russell's are prime winners for being much more instructive and helpful than Wittgenstein's. The same is for "Philosophical Investigations". I have Kripke's and Belnap and Steel's comments... and even having them it's not easy to hold myself from claiming that all that work - "P.I" - is a big vaguely commented one Augustine's article from his very famous book. 2. I think the same, it seems to be poor for languages to express thoughts. I think I've already posted somewhere about a poet Tyutchev, and his quote about impossibility on expressing our thoughts. "...tap into the same inner universal conceptualised world" - What do you think about the generated grammatics of Chomsky? I know that he had many followers. Steve Pinker, for example, one who makes this idea wider. I have another couple of questions for you. What do you mean about "inner" - can you locate it? And another one - could you draw a line between primitive and advanced conceptions? I'm asking it, because it's not interesting only for me. Ok, let's take for granted that all we've got some universe of conceptions, or a conceptualized world... whichever. But - that is I think to be absolutely necessary - how could we verify it? As soon as there are no falsification to this theory is possible (I don't know exactly, but I highly sure about this - Descartes position along with Dennett's help me with it (briefly, our mind is trying to make many barriers on the path of for our investigations), we need to find the specified C, that is a consequent of our theory to prove this position. Chomsky uses explanation for children about how easily they start comprehending what's going on and quickly giving names to everything. 3. I don't know what is happening in our skulls, all I believe is that behaviorism is still helpful. Ordinary science rides not bad; we just start to forgot feeding it with healthy food more often.
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Post by xxxxxxxxx on Jan 19, 2020 20:27:12 GMT
They say a man abandoned somewhere, in the forest for example, starts walking circles. Your answer reminded me this fact. Does it mean all we do is wandering circles?.. I wouldn't refuse this theory, because synchrophasotron movement seems to be inside even in tiniest processes. However, I believe in "the Great Leap" - from our past to our future. We exist through loops. All habits are loops, all repetitive thinking is a loop. In order to escape one cycle sometimes you have to make the leap of faith and jump for another.
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Post by Eugene 2.0 on Jan 19, 2020 22:28:08 GMT
They say a man abandoned somewhere, in the forest for example, starts walking circles. Your answer reminded me this fact. Does it mean all we do is wandering circles?.. I wouldn't refuse this theory, because synchrophasotron movement seems to be inside even in tiniest processes. However, I believe in "the Great Leap" - from our past to our future. We exist through loops. All habits are loops, all repetitive thinking is a loop. In order to escape one cycle sometimes you have to make the leap of faith and jump for another. You know, NineX, recently I had a little and short vision. I think I've got a tiny part of you've been saying constantly about a year ago. I mean this idea of loops through loops, tautology through tautologies... You must be genius! Surely, I'm not sure about what I've seen as what you've said, while the idea of it - circular motion doesn't seem to me negatively any longer. (I never doubt in it either, but now I suppose to take it clear.) If I'm thinking there might be something as a line, or something... maybe it's not the line, maybe it's a circle, or a cube... not so important, but it's kinda flashlight's light that's coming from the lamp and like a projector beats something with this light as a lightning. So, If I'm thinking there might be some sequence, some order. In this case "order" doesn't correspond to the order. "Order" is what remains changing "light" to "sequence". If I'm thinking, the order's going deeply and all parts that I see as parts are part of those remains of the light. No matter - dividing the thought further, or grouping some "thoughts" together - the result is almost the same - thinking is continue. If I'm thinking the loop of thinking is going, and going, and going on on each step. It doesn't matter there are no changes; they might be. But all the tools our minds are using are loops too. Surely, that taking loops as loops my thinking should change into something another, but it wouldn't, because there are no "changes" more. Circular scenarios of "changing" from loops to loops are crawling, changing rather me, then mechanisms of "changing" itself. So, why the negation wouldn't be what we call "changing" every next level ("nexts" and "levels" are nothing more, than the borders of that light - what we consider as those borders). If there's no composition there's no circularity, and there's no motion. A composition is what be grabbed by the mind, bundled up into the roundness. The composited picture is what has been seen along with visioning of the light.
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Post by jonbain on Jan 19, 2020 23:55:10 GMT
How to destroy philosophy you may ask? Many tried, but it wasn't easy as long as liars participated debates (in which they were supposed to be sent to death). Each time the science had been shrugging its shoulders and arose as a titan some liars did not well things inventing stupid accusations; people believed those liars and the scientists were needed to be quiet to survive. But the question of burying philosophy has been arising once again and not only once. This question is important, because of - whether philosophy is playing role of an arbiter in science or what? If this is so (or maybe any other arguments), then we shouldn't kill philosophy as long as it serves us as a tool of sharping our reasons. Then, philosophy is a servant to science? The great tragedy is when philosophy sees itself (and is seen by others) as the servant of science. These 'philosophists' are then little more than petty bureaucrats whose purpose is to lick the boots of the scientists, and ward off any attempt to put science in its proper place: the servant of ethics. All genuine scientific endeavour is a solution to an ethical problem, whether to save lives (medicine), or even to win wars over barbaric masses, or to simply lay a logical grounding for new sciences. When science tries to elevate itself above ethics, the result is ego: elitists and petty hierarchies. The psychology of which is typically Freudian. The result is the collapse of that society into war, civil-war, or just degenerative dystopia. In this era, the immediate ethical question is the environment. But money-grubbing egotists, will return society to a feudal/medieval state, if they are allowed to. This is the most likely tragedy: the next 100 years sees no significant change, other than a steady erosion of life and health that will go with the decaying of the environment. The cause of this: the 'philosophist'. The noble philosopher is ready to take on the Herculean task of subduing the ego of science to its position as the pet dog of its true masters: philosophy, ethics, metaphysics.
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Post by xxxxxxxxx on Jan 20, 2020 2:10:10 GMT
We exist through loops. All habits are loops, all repetitive thinking is a loop. In order to escape one cycle sometimes you have to make the leap of faith and jump for another. You know, NineX, recently I had a little and short vision. I think I've got a tiny part of you've been saying constantly about a year ago. I mean this idea of loops through loops, tautology through tautologies... You must be genius! Surely, I'm not sure about what I've seen as what you've said, while the idea of it - circular motion doesn't seem to me negatively any longer. (I never doubt in it either, but now I suppose to take it clear.) If I'm thinking there might be something as a line, or something... maybe it's not the line, maybe it's a circle, or a cube... not so important, but it's kinda flashlight's light that's coming from the lamp and like a projector beats something with this light as a lightning. So, If I'm thinking there might be some sequence, some order. In this case "order" doesn't correspond to the order. "Order" is what remains changing "light" to "sequence". If I'm thinking, the order's going deeply and all parts that I see as parts are part of those remains of the light. No matter - dividing the thought further, or grouping some "thoughts" together - the result is almost the same - thinking is continue. If I'm thinking the loop of thinking is going, and going, and going on on each step. It doesn't matter there are no changes; they might be. But all the tools our minds are using are loops too. Surely, that taking loops as loops my thinking should change into something another, but it wouldn't, because there are no "changes" more. Circular scenarios of "changing" from loops to loops are crawling, changing rather me, then mechanisms of "changing" itself. So, why the negation wouldn't be what we call "changing" every next level ("nexts" and "levels" are nothing more, than the borders of that light - what we consider as those borders). If there's no composition there's no circularity, and there's no motion. A composition is what be grabbed by the mind, bundled up into the roundness. The composited picture is what has been seen along with visioning of the light. No Eugene I am not a genius. I just payed attention to how I think and how people around me think. We repeat things in loops. Second I studied and focused on the Munchauseen trilemma, and its variations, for some years and applied it to everything I observed...including the trilemma itself. After noticing how common the circle appears, I kept looking for more loops to see how far it went....and it goes real deep. I have learned God exists, whether you want it or not...and I have to confess personal guilt as there have been times I wished God did not exist. But God is merciful, even though we all reap what we sow. Anyhow, modern philosophy is dead...but that does not mean philosophy itself is not dead. If you want to walk away knowing objective absolute truths exist, you might want to look under the symbols of the "⊙" and "+" (or "x") and contemplate these things deeply. Start looking for loops, that which repeats, and "intersections/crosses", that which joins/synthesizes. Reality is a series of fractals, think of everything like Russian mirror dolls or a white light going through a prism and resulting on variations of the white light.
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Post by karl on Jan 20, 2020 6:40:49 GMT
I agree with Russell's claim when he stated that Wittgenstein prefers mysticism, for it allows him not to think. Wittgenstein's contempt for truth was well exemplified in his statement about Kurt Gödel's incompleteness theorem, attempting to reject its importance. Gödel responded with disbelief, asking whether Wittgenstein had lost his mind. But he hadn't. He was just dishonest to the core.
The problem with language is that it's always one step behind expressing our true thoughts. Since our thought processes are helped by language, it's a continuous feedback process, where our expansion of understanding requires an ever more advanced language, which in turn makes it easier for us to take understanding a step further, again requiring new words to express the concepts we're using. My underlying view is that all languages tap into the same inner universal conceptualised world, and an advanced language allows one to express more universal concepts than a primitive one.
Thank you for the info about Wittgenstein - Godel little discussion. I didn't know that. But yes this explains some things. 1. I read on of Russian philosopher and linguist Vadim Rudnev who commented the translated work of Wittgenstein, and he said that Wittgenstein anticipated the Godel's theorem in his Tractatus. He held a discussion with another philosopher who objected his argument on Wittgenstein's anticipation. I don't know if there were any anticipations, but I think I agree with you and Russell at Wittgenstein's "weirdness", while being some skeptical toward his mysticism. Being not highly sure, but reading his diaries one'd rather find some strange behaviour, than mystical things. That's why it's possible to think that the mysticism and weirdness of Wittgenstein was one and the same. Besides of using codes to hide his daily diary Wittgenstein used many !-signs (attention?.. warn-sing?.. I don't know a name of this sign in English), while he never used superstitions or numerologies and so on. He claimed about himself as a monk among crowds; his comrades (unfortunately I don't know correct and not communistic term for this word that's why I used this one here) said that Wittgenstein did act strangely. Also, that is notable, surround situation didn't touch him, he never reacted on it like he was living inside of his own world. Moreover, the things he wrote was not easy to understand (taking as example his "Tractatus"), so he was the only one who could decode it. Beating children (if this info was really true) must discover his person better to characterize him as a strange, a weird person, rather then mystical. And what is absolutely remarkable (in his "Diaries 1914-1916" I read the story which was added just as an article, about dialogue between Moore and Russell on Wittgenstein examination right after the author of Tractatus was passed the exam... Russell and Moore were both completely discouraged to hell glancing at the work of Wittgenstein. So do many people. I spoke with some and they were complaining about this much. I used many commentary works, but I highly doubt I got something from this work much. Karnap's for example or Russell's are prime winners for being much more instructive and helpful than Wittgenstein's. The same is for "Philosophical Investigations". I have Kripke's and Belnap and Steel's comments... and even having them it's not easy to hold myself from claiming that all that work - "P.I" - is a big vaguely commented one Augustine's article from his very famous book. 2. I think the same, it seems to be poor for languages to express thoughts. I think I've already posted somewhere about a poet Tyutchev, and his quote about impossibility on expressing our thoughts. "...tap into the same inner universal conceptualised world" - What do you think about the generated grammatics of Chomsky? I know that he had many followers. Steve Pinker, for example, one who makes this idea wider. I have another couple of questions for you. What do you mean about "inner" - can you locate it? And another one - could you draw a line between primitive and advanced conceptions? I'm asking it, because it's not interesting only for me. Ok, let's take for granted that all we've got some universe of conceptions, or a conceptualized world... whichever. But - that is I think to be absolutely necessary - how could we verify it? As soon as there are no falsification to this theory is possible (I don't know exactly, but I highly sure about this - Descartes position along with Dennett's help me with it (briefly, our mind is trying to make many barriers on the path of for our investigations), we need to find the specified C, that is a consequent of our theory to prove this position. Chomsky uses explanation for children about how easily they start comprehending what's going on and quickly giving names to everything. 3. I don't know what is happening in our skulls, all I believe is that behaviorism is still helpful. Ordinary science rides not bad; we just start to forgot feeding it with healthy food more often.
I only have limited knowledge about Chomsky's view of language. He has asserted that when we think, we internalise external language, seemingly claiming that we always think in words and sentences. If this is a correct interpretation, then I disagree, as I see the mind as struggling to express its thoughts within the limits of language. To accept the limits of language as the limits for one's own thoughts, is to make oneself servile to the intersubjectivity of one's time. An expansion of thought requires an expansion of language, and an expansion of language must always start with the individual willing to see beyond the framework of thought it's presented with through its language and culture. Wittgenstein also claim we are basically trapped within the language we use, and referred contemptuously as "mentalism" the idea that there are thought processes beyond language. He asserted that not even God can therefore read our thoughts. It makes the individual small and insignificant, trapped mentally and intellectually within the context of it's own environment.
If Chomsky doesn't believe in independent thought processes beyond language, then that can explain why he rejects the idea that Neanderthals had their own language. I think his idea is that language, and hence thought and everything we associate with the human intellect, is something intrinsic to modern humans, everyone else being excluded. Within such a framework of thought there would be no room for see consciousness as being able to connect with concepts outside of language, since it almost inevitably lead us to conclude that thinking isn't an exclusively human trait. Whatever has consciousness may understand concepts, even if the most primitive forms of consciousness may only think in the most rudimentary and primitive way.
As for identifying universal concepts, now that would be an immensely difficult task, but for now I'd settled for giving one example, which is the induction principle, the core foundation for science, which cannot prove itself or be deduced by any principle more fundamental than itself. A simple version of it would be: "If you do experiment A and it leads to B, then the more times you repeat this experiment with the same result, the more convinced you become that this will also be the outcome next time you do the experiment."
This is a given axiom for science, and anyone may oppose it if they like. We would know that they'd be wrong, but we could never prove it to them. We understand the principle as a universal concept, but we can't defend this understanding. It's self-evident, and is ultimately based on an inherent belief in that there must be some kind of order to reality. Although "belief" is too weak of a word. We "know" there is order to reality, but we cannot explain how we know it.
And yes, I've also learned that Wittgenstein, at least on one occasion, hit a child. I haven't studied Wittgenstein's psychology to any debt, but I would guess that if I did, I'd find that what he really wanted to accomplish with his philosophy was to free himself from the responsibility of having to learn to distinguish between right and wrong, true and false.
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Post by Calliope on Jan 20, 2020 21:44:00 GMT
Philosophy defines itself as a open activity in search for truth. It's impossible to advocate the end of philosophy whithout philosophising in a way or in another.
Philosophy can be defined also as an activity in the search of inteligibility. Only philosophy can understand phenomena as itself. Science is a search for plausibility, and logical teorization.
No, the relation of master science and servant science is a medieval way of think the scientific phenomena, not apropriate for the news philosophical problems that modernity is now confronting.
It's the categories that we use who defines our thought, and the result of reasoning. Whitehead, for example, makes a extreme effort to correct the scientific categories of nature and reason, not for a small price.
Caution with that formal preliminar teorization who makes obscure the cleaness of mind of our perception.
Greetings for all.
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Post by Elizabeth on Jan 21, 2020 1:54:36 GMT
Philosophy defines itself as a open activity in search for truth. It's impossible to advocate the end of philosophy whithout philosophising in a way or in another. Philosophy can be defined also as an activity in the search of inteligibility. Only philosophy can understand phenomena as itself. Science is a search for plausibility, and logical teorization. No, the relation of master science and servant science is a medieval way of think the scientific phenomena, not apropriate for the news philosophical problems that modernity is now confronting. It's the categories that we use who defines our thought, and the result of reasoning. Whitehead, for example, makes a extreme effort to correct the scientific categories of nature and reason, not for a small price. Caution with that formal preliminar teorization who makes obscure the cleaness of mind of our perception. Greetings for all. Can we say for sure it's in search of intelligence? Isn't it just a way to question how the world works but not actually search for the answers that scientists do?
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Post by Calliope on Jan 21, 2020 8:07:09 GMT
Well, doesn't inteligente is the best when we desire well being and moral satisfaction? I think that gaining intelligence by studying symbols or fables more proficuous that studying manuals of logic. But dissolving the elements of life in atoms of desire is not my quest. I desire concrete acquisition, and a mode of being capable of doing really admirable things.
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